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ABSTRACT 
 
Joint provision of tax and audit services has been under regulatory scrutiny for over a decade.  I 
use a source credibility framework to map the costs and benefits of joint provision to the 
components of source credibility, competence and trustworthiness, to explain the effect of 
aggressiveness and complexity on investors’ preferences and subsequent investment decisions.  
Experimental results indicate that investors prefer tax preparation to be provided by an 
accounting firm not engaged as the auditor rather than by an accounting firm jointly providing 
tax and audit services.  Results also indicate that although aggressiveness does not affect this 
preference, complexity increases investors’ preference for non-joint provision.  Additional 
results indicate that the auditor tax preparer is perceived to be less competent and less 
trustworthy than the non-auditor tax preparer.  This study contributes to the accounting literature 
on joint provision, with implications for both tax providers and managers.    
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
During the last decade, regulators have scrutinized the role of the tax preparer.  
Discussions prior to the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) suggested a ban on auditor-provided 
tax services (Lassila et al. 2010).  Although SOX did not ban such services, the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) examined the effect of the joint 
provision of tax and audit services on auditor independence and adopted rules addressing 
this issue in 2005 (PCAOB 2004).  The Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) 
requires the disclosure of tax fees paid to firms that provide tax services to audit clients.  
In 2011, the IRS adopted regulation requiring registration, testing and continuing 
education requirements for tax preparers not subject to oversight, including competency 
tests for all paid tax return preparers except attorneys, certified public accountants 
(CPAs) and enrolled agents who are active and in good standing with their respective 
licensing agencies (Internal Revenue Service 2011).  The purpose of these regulations is 
to provide better protection and service for taxpayers and to increase confidence in the 
tax system.   
The regulations proposed by the PCAOB, SEC and IRS address concerns about 
the competence of tax preparers, and also about their independence, especially in 
situations where the tax provider is also the firm’s external auditor.  While prior research 
indicates that joint provision of tax and audit services does not impair independence in 
fact (Kinney et al. 2004; Gleason and Mills 2011; Paterson and Valencia 2011), less is 
known about the effect of joint provision on investors’ perceptions of independence (i.e., 
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independence in appearance).  In this study I examine whether investors share regulators’ 
concerns about joint provision, and whether their preferences are moderated by the 
aggressiveness and complexity of a firm’s tax strategy.   
I examine investors’ preferences for joint provision using a source credibility 
framework (Mercer 2005; Hovland et al. 1953).  I map the costs and benefits of joint 
provision to the components of source credibility, competence and trustworthiness.  An 
important potential benefit of joint provision is knowledge spillover 
1
 (i.e., synergistic 
gains in the provider’s understanding of the client) (Lassila et al. 2010).  I argue that 
knowledge spillover improves the preparer’s competence.  However, a potential cost of 
joint provision is a loss of independence (Lassila et al. 2010, Gaynor et al. 2006).  I argue 
that a loss of independence reduces the preparer’s trustworthiness.   
Based on prior research (e.g., Gaynor et al. 2006), my first prediction is that 
investors will generally favor non-joint provision, due to concerns about independence.  
Then, using the source credibility framework, I predict that investors’ preferences for 
joint provision will vary depending on the aggressiveness and complexity of the firm’s 
tax strategy.  Specifically, I predict that an increase in the aggressiveness of a firm’s tax 
position is likely to increase the value of independence because of two elements of 
additional risk posed by the more aggressive position.  First, an increase in tax 
aggressiveness leads to an increased risk of disallowance and subsequent cost to 
shareholders.  Second, an increase in tax aggressiveness offers greater opportunity for 
                                                 
1
 Knowledge spillover refers to the fact that an external auditor obtains knowledge while providing a non-
audit service that the auditor may not have otherwise gained.  This additional information can lead to 
improved audits. Therefore, knowledge spillover is expected to improve audit quality (see, e.g. Simunic, 
1984; Kinney et al 2004; Schneider et al 2006).   Knowledge spillovers also can be expected to occur from 
the auditor to the tax preparer, and thus, would be expected to improve the quality of the tax information 
and preparation process, as well. 
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managerial diversion of resources from shareholders (Desai and Dharmapala 2006).  A 
preparer who also provides audit services is more likely to suffer a loss of independence 
in appearance than a preparer providing only tax services, because the firm jointly 
providing audit and tax services essentially audits its own work, while no such conflict of 
interest exists for the non-auditor tax preparer.  Because a more aggressive tax position 
entails greater risk, investors’ need for confidence in the trustworthiness of the preparer is 
elevated.  Thus investors are likely to attach greater importance to the trustworthiness 
component of preparer credibility as aggressiveness increases.  Given the expected 
negative association between joint provision and perceptions of trustworthiness, I predict 
that investors are less (more) likely to favor joint provision when the firm’s tax strategy is 
more (less) aggressive.   
In contrast, an increase in the complexity of a firm’s tax position is likely to 
increase investors’ concerns about the competence of the preparer.  More competent 
preparers are more likely to have the requisite knowledge and experience to execute 
complex tax strategies correctly.  Thus investors are likely to attach greater importance to 
the competence component of preparer credibility, relative to the trustworthiness 
component, as complexity increases.  In other words, complexity increases the potential 
benefits of knowledge spillover (Lassila et al. 2010).  Given the expected positive 
association between joint provision and perceptions of competence, I predict that 
investors are more (less) likely to favor joint provision when the firm’s tax strategy is 
more (less) complex.   
In my experiment, MBA students participate as potential investors, analyzing 
information about two hypothetical firms in order to make an investment decision.  I 
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provide participants with summarized financial statements and information about a 
particular tax position each company has taken.  The experiment employs a 2 x 2 x 2 
mixed design, manipulating joint provision within subjects and tax aggressiveness and 
complexity between subjects.  Specifically, one company has engaged the same firm to 
jointly provide tax and audit services, while the other company has engaged one firm to 
serve as the external auditor and a second firm to provide tax services.  The 
aggressiveness and complexity of the tax position are each manipulated at two levels 
(high or low) through textual descriptions.  Based on the information provided, 
participants allocate a $10,000 investment between the two companies.  Participants also 
provide justification for their choices and evaluations of the credibility of the different 
preparer types. 
I find that, on average, investors are less likely to invest in a firm that receives tax 
and audit services from the same provider than in a firm that engages separate firms to 
provide tax and audit services.  I also find that the level of tax aggressiveness does not 
affect the investment decision.  Non-auditor tax preparers are perceived to be more 
independent, less biased, more truthful, and more credible; yet as aggressiveness 
increases, investors are not more likely to invest in a company that has engaged the non-
auditor tax preparer.  Moreover, I find that tax complexity does affect investors’ 
preferences.  As complexity increases, investors are more likely to invest in the company 
that has engaged the tax preparer they perceive to be more competent, although the firm 
perceived to be more competent is not the firm I predict to be perceived as such.     
This study contributes to the audit and tax literatures by providing evidence that 
joint provision influences investors’ perceptions of tax preparer competence and 
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independence, with subsequent effects on their investment decisions.  This paper also 
informs the literature regarding the relative importance of audit versus tax quality by 
providing evidence that in a situation that potentially increases tax quality while 
threatening audit quality via impaired independence in appearance, investors weigh the 
threat to perceived audit quality more heavily than the potential benefits to tax quality.  
When choosing between a company that has engaged an auditor tax preparer and a 
company that has engaged a non-auditor tax preparer, participants indicate that the 
potential benefit of knowledge spillover that occurs when tax and audit services are 
jointly provided is less than the cost of impaired independence.  The importance of 
independence and audit quality overwhelms the benefit that joint provision can bring to 
tax quality. 
This paper contributes to the joint provision literature by taking a broad 
perspective regarding tax services; rather than focusing on tax services as an auditor-
provided NAS only, the paper expands the focus by including tax services by non-auditor 
tax preparers.  This shift in focus allows for an examination of investors’ reactions to 
joint provision of tax and audit services compared to a “control” condition that occurs 
when the tax service is provided externally by a non-auditor (Kinney et al. 2004).
2
  
Previous literature provides evidence that increasing joint provision leads to lower quality 
earnings (Krishnan et al. 2005, Frances and Ke 2006), but the literature has not isolated 
the level of services jointly provided to compare to the same service and same level of 
service provided by a non-auditor because the non-jointly provided services do not 
                                                 
2
 The joint provision literature has not examined the comparison of a service provided as an NAS vs. as a 
non-NAS (a service by a non-auditor provider).  The lack of research is not an omission by choice.  This 
information is not publicly available; therefore, archival methods cannot capture this comparison. 
6 
 
require disclosure and are therefore unobservable.  In other words, whether it is the level 
of the service provided or the joint provision (of the NAS and audit service) that affects 
earnings quality is unknown.  This paper addresses the possibility that a high level of tax 
services provided by a non-auditor preparer may be less preferable than a high level of 
NAS by comparing investor perceptions across external preparers, thereby making a 
horizontal comparison across the provider of the service while holding the level of the 
service constant rather than making a vertical comparison across levels of the service 
provided, as has been done in the joint provision literature.  This paper also provides 
insight into the factors affecting investor preferences for joint provision by mapping 
preferences to a source credibility framework. 
In addition, this paper extends the source credibility literature by examining the 
effect of risk on the influence of source credibility, by studying tax aggressiveness and 
complexity as moderating variables.  Risk factors related to the tax position, i.e., 
aggressiveness and complexity, affect the relative importance of the credibility 
components, trustworthiness and competence.  This extends the source credibility 
literature by providing evidence that risk moderates the effect of source credibility on 
judgment, in this case, the effect that source credibility has on an investment decision. 
This study contributes to the regulatory discussion regarding the costs and 
benefits of the joint provision of tax and audit services.  Specifically, I address whether 
the concerns expressed by regulators relating to tax preparer independence are shared by 
investors, and I provide evidence that joint provision does affect independence in 
appearance.  In general, investors perceive the threat to independence to be too great a 
cost when choosing between an auditor tax preparer and a non-auditor tax preparer.  This 
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result provides evidence in support of the concerns that regulators expressed prior to the 
passing of SOX related to the decision to allow joint provision of tax and audit services.    
Chapter 2 provides a theoretical background.  Chapter 3 develops the hypotheses.  
Chapter 4 presents the experiment.  Chapter 5 discusses the results.  Chapter 6 concludes 
the paper. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Joint Provision of Tax and Audit Services 
 The provision of non-audit services by auditors has been under regulatory 
scrutiny for more than 10 years.  In the 1990’s, fees from NAS increased at a greater rate 
than audit fees, and by 2000, NAS fees were twice as high as audit fees in a sample of 
over 2,500 public companies (Kinney et al. 2004; Markelevich et al. 2005).  The rapid 
growth of NAS fees as well as increases in restatements and other accounting 
irregularities led the SEC to require disclosure of audit fees and other components in 
2000 (SEC 2000).  Accounting scandals such as Enron and WorldCom led to the 
enactment of SOX in 2002, which prohibited the joint provision of audit services and 
certain NAS.  In 2003, the SEC again revised disclosure rules to require separate 
statements of audit fees, audit-related fees, tax fees, and other NAS fees (SEC 2003). 
Discussions prior to and following SOX debated whether tax services should be 
allowed as an NAS.  In 2004, the PCAOB held roundtable discussions regarding whether 
joint provision of tax and audit services impairs auditor independence.  Opponents of 
joint provision argued that tax NAS can lead to lower audit quality via impaired 
independence because the revenues and high margins from tax services might affect 
auditors’ judgments (Kinney et al. 2004; Lassila et al. 2010; Omer et al. 2006).  They also 
argued that auditors cannot objectively assess the reasonableness of tax strategies sold to 
audit clients by their own firm (Rankin 2004).  In addition to concerns regarding 
impaired independence in fact, concerns exist that joint provision of tax and audit 
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services might impair independence in appearance, leading to perceptions of lower 
financial reporting quality (Kinney et al. 2004).  Proponents of joint provision argued that 
audit quality and the firm’s tax position can be improved through the knowledge 
spillovers that occur between the audit and tax teams of a firm jointly providing both 
services (Lassila et al. 2010, Omer et al. 2006).  Gleason and Mills (2011) find that firms 
purchasing auditor provided tax services have more adequate and accurate tax reserves 
than firms that do not purchase auditor provided tax services, providing evidence of the 
benefit of knowledge spillover for the tax preparer, in addition to the benefits provided to 
the auditor.    
Auditors must maintain independence in fact and in appearance in their 
relationships with audit clients as a requirement of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA) Code of Professional Conduct and a rule of the SEC (e.g. 
SEC 2000).  Kinney et al. (2004) provide evidence that joint provision of tax and audit 
services does not impair independence in fact, as firms that pay more for tax NAS had 
fewer financial reporting restatements than those who paid smaller amounts or nothing 
for tax NAS.  Whether joint provision impairs auditor independence in appearance is an 
important and unanswered question.  Lassila et al. (2010) examine factors affecting 
independence in appearance via companies’ perceptions of the trade-off between 
knowledge spillovers and perceived impaired independence.  They find evidence that 
increased complexity, stronger corporate governance, and more auditor independence 
lead to the retention of the auditor as tax service provider.  These results suggest that 
factors that increase the value of knowledge spillovers, such as complex transactions or 
positions, or factors that decrease concerns about auditor independence, such as stronger 
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controls, lower nontax NAS fees, and shorter auditor tenure, lead to a greater likelihood 
of retaining the auditor as tax provider.  
The audit literature suggests that firms providing both NAS and audit services 
benefit from having further insight into the client’s business and transactions, leading to 
greater audit effectiveness (e.g., Simunic 1984; Whisenant et al. 2003; Kinney et al. 
2004).  In particular, Kinney et al. (2004) find that joint provision of tax and audit 
services is associated with higher quality financial reporting. 
3
 
Source Credibility 
Source credibility is the extent to which a communicator is perceived to be 
trustworthy and competent (Hovland et al. 1953; Giffin 1967; Mercer 2005).  Source 
credibility has been examined in various literatures; for example, in examining juror’s 
perceptions of eyewitness accounts and expert testimonies (for a review, see Spellman 
and Tenney 2010) and readers’ comprehension of text (e.g., Sparks and Rapp 2011).  
Prior research in accounting has shown that source credibility affects users’ reactions to 
financial statement information and their investment decisions.  Hirst et al. (2007) find 
that the source credibility of management is enhanced when earnings forecasts are 
disaggregated rather than aggregated.  Clor-Proell (2009) finds that the extent to which 
reported financial statement information matches financial statement users’ expectations 
affects users’ credibility judgments of management, and those credibility judgments 
mediate the users’ investment decisions.  Williams (1996) finds that analysts’ perceptions 
                                                 
3
 Alternatively, knowledge spillover may present an opportunity for management malfeasance.  Cook et al. 
(2008) provide evidence of increased earnings management associated with joint provision of tax and audit 
services.  For firms that would miss consensus earnings forecasts without effective tax rate (ETR) changes, 
higher tax fees paid to auditors are associated with greater reductions in third-to-fourth quarter ETRs.  
These third-to-fourth quarter ETR reductions are potential signals of earnings management because tax 
expense is one of the last accounts closed in determining reported earnings.   
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of management credibility are affected by previous earnings forecasts.  Research in 
auditing has examined whether and how auditors incorporate the perceived competence 
and integrity of management into the evaluation of audit evidence (Rebele et al. 1988, 
Hirst 1994, Peecher 1996, Beaulieu 2001, Kizirian et al. 2005).  
Trustworthiness is the degree of confidence the recipient of a message has in the 
communicator’s intent to communicate the assertions he considers most valid (Hovland 
et al. 1953).  Components of trustworthiness include reliability, honesty, goodwill and 
intentions.  Competence is the extent to which a communicator is perceived to be a 
source of valid assertions (Hovland et al. 1953).  Competence may be evidenced by the 
quantity of pertinent information, degree of ability or skill, or validity of judgment that 
the communicator possesses (Giffin 1967).   
Joint Provision and Source Credibility 
Joint provision of tax and audit services offers potential costs and benefits that 
can be modeled within the source credibility framework (see Figure 1).  Joint provision 
poses a potential threat to independence in fact for two reasons.  First, although the tax 
and audit work is performed by two separate teams, those teams are part of the same firm, 
and the firm is effectively auditing its own work.  Second, the high margins and revenues 
produced by providing tax services might affect auditors’ judgments regarding financial 
reporting (Omer et al. 2006).  Although joint provision of tax and audit services is 
permitted under SOX, tax services are similar to the NAS banned by SOX in that the 
providing firm profits by selling services in addition to the audit.  If the client and auditor 
disagree about a financial reporting decision, the auditor must weigh the cost of losing 
the tax fee in addition to the audit fee.  If providing the tax service is highly profitable, 
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the auditor has greater incentive to concede to the client so as to not lose the additional 
revenue.    
Independence and trustworthiness are inherently related.  A trustworthy 
communicator is honest and reliable and communicates information with positive 
goodwill and intentions.  Honesty and reliability tie closely to the definition of auditor 
independence provided by the AICPA: an attitude of mind “that permits the performance 
of an attest service without being affected by influences that compromise professional 
judgment, thereby allowing an individual to act with integrity and exercise objectivity 
and professional skepticism” (AICPA).  A communicator who is perceived to be honest 
and reliable also should be perceived to have integrity and objectivity.  Goodwill and 
intentions relate to the communication process and define the perception that the 
communicator will actually relay accurate and relevant information.  Independence in 
appearance and goodwill and intentions appear to be closely aligned.  When 
independence is questioned, there is a perception of a lack of trustworthiness.  The 
auditor may either be acting without integrity or may be communicating information in a 
biased manner.     
Joint provision of tax and audit services provides a potential benefit through 
increased competence because, although the tax and audit work is performed by two 
separate teams, those teams are part of the same firm, which potentially facilitates 
knowledge spillover between the tax and audit teams.  Knowledge spillover refers to the 
fact that an external auditor obtains knowledge while providing a non-audit service that 
the auditor may not have otherwise gained.  The non-auditor tax preparer does not have 
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access to the additional information that is obtained by the auditor preparer via the joint 
provision knowledge spillover.     
Tax services are not included in the list of non-audit services prohibited by SOX, 
in part because of the presumed benefits that joint provision may provide, such as lower 
cost of capital and increased after-tax earnings (Omer et al. 2006).  When choosing a tax 
preparer, companies must decide whether the benefit of joint provision, an increase in 
competence primarily arising from knowledge spillover, outweighs the cost of joint 
provision, a threat to trustworthiness via the perception of impaired auditor 
independence, which may affect perceptions of audit quality. 
4
   
  
  
                                                 
4
 An additional potential benefit companies may consider in choosing whether to engage the external 
auditor as the tax preparer is a fee discount that may be available from bundled services.    
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESES 
 
Although joint provision of tax and audit services can increase audit quality 
through potential knowledge spillover, it can also lead to perceived threats to auditor 
independence.  When evaluating the costs and benefits of joint provision, investors may 
be influenced by the ease of recalling recent high-profile audit failures, such as Enron, 
WorldCom, and Waste Management.  Tversky and Kahneman (1974) explain that the 
ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind affects individuals’ 
assessment of the probability of an event.  More salient occurrences are perceived to 
occur more frequently than less salient occurrences.  This heuristic is referred to as 
availability.  The availability heuristic is problematic when the ease of retrieving 
examples is influenced by factors unrelated to the actual frequency of occurrence.  One 
such factor is media coverage of events.  For example, the media is more likely to cover 
violent, dramatic events leading to death, such as tornadoes and homicides, than less 
sensational (but more frequent) causes of death, such as disease (Kunda 1999).   
Similarly, the media is more likely to focus on high-profile instances of audit 
failure than on the many successful audits conducted each year.  In addition, media 
coverage of audit failure tends to focus disproportionately on auditor independence 
(Taylor et al. 2003).  With regards to the failure of Enron, concern about auditor 
independence was pervasive in the media coverage, while other important factors related 
to auditor integrity (paper shredding) and auditor expertise (the complexity of Enron’s 
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audit) were overlooked.  Therefore, when investors recall instances of audit failure, 
concerns regarding auditor independence are likely to be highly available.   
Gaynor et al. (2006) provide evidence that when the joint provision of audit 
services and NAS that improve audit quality is disclosed to investors, audit committee 
members do not choose joint provision, citing concerns about independence.  Even when 
the NAS will improve audit quality, independence concerns override the potential 
benefits.  Gaynor et al. (2006) find that investors prefer joint provision when they are 
provided detailed information regarding the boost in audit quality, but when only 
provided with a basic disclosure regarding joint provision, investors’ concerns about joint 
provision align more closely with audit committee members’ concerns.  Based on this 
research, I predict that investors’ concerns regarding auditor independence will outweigh 
any potential benefit arising from knowledge spillover and that these concerns will be 
manifest in their investment decisions.    
H1:  Ceteris paribus, investors are likely to invest more in a company 
engaging a non-auditor tax preparer than a company engaging an auditor tax 
preparer. 
 
The Effects of Tax Risk Factors 
Aggressiveness 
Tax avoidance is defined as the reduction of explicit taxes, and such tax 
avoidance activities lie along a continuum of aggressiveness (Hanlon and Heitzman 
2010).  Evasion, which is illegal tax avoidance or extremely high aggressiveness, lies on 
one end of the continuum, while tax strategies such as investing in tax-preferred 
municipal bonds lie near the opposite end.   
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Because risk-neutral investors desire profit maximization, they prefer 
management to pursue tax minimizing strategies for which the expected benefits exceed 
the potential costs (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010).  As a tax strategy moves further along 
the tax aggressiveness continuum toward tax evasion, the risk associated with that 
strategy increases.  A more aggressive strategy offers greater tax savings but also brings a 
higher risk of being disallowed upon IRS audit, with a subsequently higher cost resulting 
from fines and penalties.  
I propose that because of the higher risk and potential cost involved, high levels 
of tax aggressiveness increase investors’ sensitivity to the credibility of the preparer.  
Friedman and Friedman (1979) find that participants prefer expert endorsers for products 
high in financial risk, as compared to celebrity or typical-consumer endorsers.  Harmon 
and Coney (1982) find that when participants’ initial attitudes toward an action are 
unfavorable (favorable), the use of a highly (moderately) credible source is more 
effective than the use of a moderately (highly) credible source.  In other words, demand 
for source credibility increases as risk increases.   
I hypothesize that the increased risk associated with a higher level of tax 
aggressiveness will lead investors to prefer firms with more independent tax preparation.  
Agency problems that exist in corporations resulting from the separation of ownership 
and control can lead to corporate tax decisions that benefit management at the expense of 
investors.  Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) find evidence that a company’s stock price 
declines when there is news about its involvement in a tax shelter.  One potential 
explanation for this finding is that shareholders are concerned that management’s 
willingness to cheat the IRS is a signal of its willingness to also cheat them.  They find 
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that tax shelter firms with strong corporate governance have a smaller stock price decline 
than other tax shelter firms.  Wilson (2009) also finds evidence that strong corporate 
governance mediates the effect of aggressiveness on stockholder value.  Wilson finds that 
firms actively engaged in tax shelters with strong corporate governance exhibited positive 
abnormal returns, whereas firms with poor corporate governance had no abnormal returns 
when compared to the control sample of firms not engaged in tax shelters. 
In addition to corporate governance, tax authorities have been studied as a control 
mechanism for potential agency problems (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Desai et al. 2007).  
Desai et al. (2007) argue that a strong tax authority provides monitoring and has aligned 
incentives with shareholders to reduce diversion of resources by management.  They find 
that as tax enforcement increases, diversion of resources decreases, and stock prices 
increase.   
I argue that a non-auditor tax preparer can serve as a monitor in a manner similar 
to a tax authority.  A company that engages a non-auditor tax preparer rather than an 
auditor preparer is providing additional monitoring of the tax position taken.  Instead of 
one firm being responsible for tax planning and compliance as well as auditing the tax 
position taken, two firms are involved: one responsible for tax planning and compliance, 
the other providing assurance that the transaction is reported according to generally 
accepted accounting principles.  As the tax position becomes more aggressive and the 
risk associated with potential diversion of resources by management increases, the 
importance of the monitoring increases.   
Aggressiveness increases risk of disallowance, leading to potentially higher cost 
for the shareholder via subsequent fines and penalties.  The increased potential cost leads 
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shareholders to prefer more assurance via stronger monitoring of the decisions being 
made by management.  A more credible and trustworthy monitor is preferred.  Threats to 
independence in appearance related to joint provision of audit and tax services negatively 
affect the perceived trustworthiness of auditor preparers relative to non-auditor preparers.  
Therefore, aggressiveness magnifies the importance of independence, triggering greater 
concern regarding auditor tax preparers.  Subsequently, investors’ preferences for a firm 
with a non-auditor tax preparer will be greater when aggressiveness is higher rather than 
lower, relative to a firm with an auditor tax preparer.  
H2: Investors’ relative preference for a firm engaging a non-auditor tax preparer 
is greater when tax aggressiveness is high than when it is low. 
 
Complexity 
Another factor that is likely to affect investors’ relative preferences for tax 
preparation is the complexity of the firm’s tax strategies or position.  Tax complexity can 
result from firm characteristics (i.e., firm size), operating decisions (e.g., foreign 
involvement), or tax transactions structured in a complex manner (Lassila et al. 2010).  
Research indicates that tax or operational complexity is positively associated with tax 
compliance and planning costs (Omer et al. 2006; Mills et al. 1998).  Based on these 
findings, Lassila et al. (2010) assume that high compliance and planning costs resulting 
from tax complexity create a greater potential for value from exploiting knowledge 
spillover opportunities.  Lassila et al. (2010) find that a company with greater tax 
complexity is more likely to retain its auditor as the tax preparer than a company with 
less tax complexity, in order to take advantage of knowledge spillover opportunities.  
Lassila et al. (2010) also find that companies with high complexity appear to expect the 
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benefits of the potential knowledge spillover opportunities to exceed the costs of 
impaired independence.  Complexity enhances the benefit of potential knowledge 
spillover, as the additional knowledge that flows from audit to tax teams regarding the 
company or transaction is increasingly valuable as the knowledge needed to handle the 
complex situation increases.  In other words, as complexity is added to a tax position, the 
benefits of knowledge spillover are more fully realized, leading to an increase in 
investors’ perceptions of the competence of the auditor tax preparer.  Although Lassila et 
al. (2010) provide evidence regarding management’s perception of the trade-off between 
independence and knowledge spillover, investors’ perceptions of that tradeoff remain an 
empirical question.  Thus I test the following hypothesis:   
H3: Investors’ relative preferences for a firm engaging a non-auditor tax preparer 
are greater when tax complexity is low than when it is high. 
 
Joint Effects of Aggressiveness and Complexity 
As previously hypothesized, aggressiveness increases investors’ concerns about 
independence; ceteris paribus, high aggressiveness increases investors’ relative 
preference for non-auditor tax preparers.  Moreover, complexity increases the value of 
potential knowledge spillovers; ceteris paribus, high complexity decreases investors’ 
relative preference for non-auditor tax preparers.  Therefore, in a situation of high 
complexity and low aggressiveness, the auditor tax preparer is perceived as more 
competent than the non-auditor tax preparer with little threat to independence.  In a 
situation of low complexity and high aggressiveness, the auditor tax preparer is perceived 
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as being relatively less trustworthy than the non-auditor tax preparer due to threats to 
independence in appearance, and the benefits from knowledge spillovers are low. 
Tension lies in the high complexity and high aggressiveness condition, in which 
both components of source credibility are affected simultaneously in opposite directions 
(see Table 1 for a synopsis of these effects).  For the auditor tax preparer, high 
complexity enhances the relative benefit of the opportunity for knowledge spillover, but 
high aggressiveness signals the need for greater independence, which non-auditor tax 
preparers can provide more easily relative to auditor tax preparers.  In other words, 
auditor tax preparers’ increased competence via knowledge spillover is more valuable as 
complexity increases but the auditor tax preparer is perceived as relatively less 
trustworthy as aggressiveness increases.  If the combination of high aggressiveness and 
high complexity simply poses a trade-off of increased competence and decreased 
trustworthiness, making a prediction regarding the relative preference for an auditor tax 
preparer difficult. 
As previously discussed, as aggressiveness increases, the risk associated with 
potential diversion of resources by management increases.  Adding complexity to high 
aggressiveness could signal an attempt by management to hide self-serving behavior via 
transactions that are difficult for investors to understand.  If the increased complexity in 
the presence of high aggressiveness signals a need for additional monitoring, then the 
benefit of knowledge spillover could be over-shadowed by the threat to independence 
(Desai et al. 2007).  Therefore, the more independent monitor, the non-auditor preparer, 
would be preferred in a high aggressiveness, high complexity condition. 
21 
 
I therefore pose the following research question. 
RQ1: What is the combined effect of high aggressiveness and high complexity on 
investors’ relative preference for a firm engaging an auditor versus non-auditor 
tax preparer? 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Participants 
 Participants were recruited from MBA courses at a large state university.  22.4% 
of participants reported more than 5 years experience in their current position.  21.1% 
reported 3 years to less than 5 years.  28.9% reported 1 year to less than 3 years.  27.6% 
reported less than 1 year. 
5
  29.4% of the participants had experience buying or selling an 
individual company’s stock, and 75.3% plan to invest in a company’s stock in the next 
five years.  For every ten participants, one participant was selected to receive $100 in a 
random drawing.   
Experimental Design and Task 
The hypotheses are tested in an experiment using a 2 x 2 x 2 design that 
manipulates tax aggressiveness and tax complexity between subjects at two levels each.  
Joint provision is a within-subjects manipulation.  Participants are randomly assigned to 
one of four conditions.   
Participants assume the role of investors making an investment decision, 
allocating $10,000 across two fictitious companies, Bradley’s Books and Sight & Sound 
Superstore.  After reading background information for each company including basic 
financial statements, participants are presented with additional information regarding a 
                                                 
5
 Of the participants reporting less than 1 year work experience, 71.4% reported “student” or “graduate 
assistant” as their current profession indicating a probable recent change from full-time employment to 
enrollment as a graduate student.  Therefore, the amount of real-world work experience those participants 
have is unknown but is expected to be greater than 1 year, and the percentage reported to have less than 1 
year of work experience in the current position is likely inflated. 
23 
 
particular tax position the company has taken and the public accounting firm(s) the 
company has engaged as tax preparer and auditor.  In all conditions, Bradley’s Books 
engages separate firms to provide tax and audit services, and Sight & Sound Superstore 
engages one firm for joint provision of tax and audit services.  The firms are identical in 
all other respects (e.g., Big 4 public accounting firms). 
6
  The financial statement ratios 
and additional information for Bradley’s Books and Sight & Sound Superstore are 
identical.
7
  
 Aggressiveness is communicated in the financial statements by a difference in 
effective tax rate (ETR).
8
  Aggressiveness is also communicated explicitly in the 
additional information by explaining that the company engaged in an innovative tax 
transaction that reduced the firm’s ETR from 26.8% in 2009 to 26.3% (26.7% for low 
aggressiveness) in 2010 and that the industry average ETR was 26.8% for 2010.  For high 
aggressiveness, the additional information also states that the transaction’s legitimacy is 
pending before the IRS, and it is uncertain whether the position will be sustained upon 
IRS audit.  For low aggressiveness, the information states that it is likely that the position 
would be allowed upon audit, and the transaction does not increase the risk of audit.  
Complexity is communicated explicitly in the additional information provided by stating 
in the high complexity condition that some of the tax planning involves complex tax 
                                                 
6
 Many companies use tax service providers that are not public accounting firms (e.g., tax attorneys).  In 
this experiment, the tax preparer is always a Big 4 public accounting firm in order to make the comparison 
between tax preparers as clean as possible, emphasizing only the difference in joint provision. 
7
 The financial statements differ as one company’s financial statement numbers are greater than the other 
company’s by a multiplier of 1.4.  I have counterbalanced the company with larger numbers so that 50% of 
participants see financial statements in which Bradley’s Books has higher revenues, assets, etc. and 50% 
see statements in which Sight & Sound Superstore has higher numbers. 
8
 ETR is calculated as Income Tax Expense / Earnings Before Income Tax.  In the low aggressiveness 
conditions, the ETR decreases from 26.8% in 2009 to 26.7% in 2010.  In the high aggressiveness 
conditions, the ETR decreases from 26.8% in 2009 to 26.3% in 2010.  In all conditions, participants might 
perceive an element of aggressiveness, as the 2010 ETR is lower than the industry average ETR (26.8%).    
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positions and strategies.  In the low complexity condition, participants are told that tax 
planning is relatively straightforward, involving uncomplicated tax positions and 
strategies.   
Participants provide their judgments of the level of aggressiveness and complexity 
of each firm’s tax position.  Participants then make an investment decision, allocating a 
$10,000 investment between the two companies.  Participants are asked to explain the 
factors that influenced their decision.  Participants complete the instrument by answering 
questions indicating perceptions of source credibility of the tax preparer, providing 
judgments of the riskiness of the tax position, answering manipulation checks, and 
providing demographic information.  A detailed description of the manipulated and 
measured variables follows below. 
Independent Variables 
The experiment manipulates whether the tax preparer is also the firm’s auditor, as 
well as both the aggressiveness and complexity of the firm’s tax position.  Participants 
are presented with two companies, one which has engaged its Big 4 auditor to provide tax 
services, the other which has engaged separate Big 4 firms to provide auditing and tax 
services.  Aggressiveness is manipulated between subjects at two levels.  In the high 
(low) aggressiveness condition, participants are told that each company has engaged in an 
innovative tax transaction that decreased the firm’s effective tax rate, and it is uncertain if 
(highly likely that) the position will be upheld upon IRS audit.  Complexity is also 
manipulated between subjects at two levels.  In the high (low) complexity condition, 
25 
 
participants are explicitly told that both companies have engaged in tax planning that 
involves complex (straightforward) tax strategies.   
Dependent Variable 
 Participants’ investment decisions are captured by asking them to allocate 
$10,000 of potential investment between Bradley’s Books and Sight & Sound Superstore.  
The dependent variable is the amount participants invested in the company that engaged a 
non-auditor tax preparer (Bradley’s Books).   
Mediating Variable 
 The mediating variable is the participant’s perception of the tax preparers’ 
credibility.  Source credibility is defined as the extent to which a communicator is 
perceived to be competent and the degree of confidence in the communicator’s intent to 
communicate the assertions he considers most valid (Giffin 1967).  Thus, I measure 
investors’ perceptions of credibility, as well as the underlying constructs of competence 
and trustworthiness. 
Mercer (2005) is perhaps the most widely cited accounting paper to measure 
source credibility.  Mercer (2005) measured investors’ perceptions of management’s 
reporting credibility by using six questions adapted from Leathers (1992) and McCroskey 
(1966).  Mercer (2005) conducted a reliability analysis on participants’ responses to the 
six questions, which yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of .78, suggesting that the scale is 
reliably capturing one underlying construct.  I adapt the questions used by Mercer (2005) 
for the context of this study.  I also include a straightforward question regarding 
perceptions of source credibility: “Which of the two tax preparers is more credible?”  See 
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Appendix A for the source credibility questions.  All source credibility questions are 
answered using a 7-point Likert-type scale with the non-auditor tax preparer at “1” and 
the auditor tax preparer at “7.” 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
 
Manipulation Checks 
 Responses to the manipulation check questions indicate that the manipulations 
were successful.  Participants indicated that the tax position was less aggressive when in 
the low aggressiveness condition (4.03 and 4.05 out of 7.0 for Bradley’s Books and Sight 
& Sound Superstore, respectively) than in the high aggressiveness condition (4.67 and 
4.98 out of 7.0; p = 0.02 and p <.001, respectively).  Participants also evaluated the firms’ 
tax positions as less complex when in the low complexity condition (3.78 and 3.53 out of 
7.0) than in the high complexity condition (4.95 and 5.02 out of 7.0; p < .001). 
Hypothesis Testing 
 Table 2 reports the descriptive data used to test the hypotheses and research 
question.  Panel A presents the mean investment in Bradley’s Books, the company not 
engaging the auditor tax preparer for all conditions.  Panel B shows the ANOVA table for 
the effects of aggressiveness and complexity on participants’ investment allocations.  
Panel C reports the results of the t-tests for H1 through H3.  Panel D presents the results 
for the research question. 
H1 predicts that investors are likely to invest more in a company that engages a 
non-auditor tax preparer than in a company that hires an auditor tax preparer.  To test this 
hypothesis, I conduct a t-test to determine whether the percentage invested in a company 
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with a non-auditor tax preparer is significantly greater than 50% of the total investment.  
Consistent with H1, participants invested more of the $10,000 investment in the company 
engaging a non-auditor tax preparer ($5,990) than in a company engaging an auditor tax 
preparer ($4,010) and more than would be expected by chance ($5,000) (see Table 2, 
Panel C: t = 3.632, p = < .001).  This result provides evidence that investors prefer non-
joint provision of tax and audit services, consistent with regulators’ concerns.  In further 
support of H1, 33.3% of participants specifically indicated concern about joint provision 
when asked for the single most important factor considered in support of the investment 
decision.
9
    
H2 predicts that investors are relatively more likely to invest in a company that 
engages a non-auditor preparer when tax aggressiveness is high than when tax 
aggressiveness is low.  To test this hypothesis, I use a one-sided t-test to determine 
whether the amount invested in the company engaging a non-auditor tax preparer is 
higher in the high aggressiveness condition than in the low aggressiveness condition.  
Contrary to H2, investors are not more likely to invest in a company engaging a non-
auditor preparer when tax aggressiveness is high ($6,043) than when tax aggressiveness 
is low ($5,927) at a significant level (Table 2, Panel C: t = .211, p = .417).   
Figure 1 presents a model mapping perceptions of independence through the 
credibility component of trustworthiness.  The model outlines H2 as follows: the non-
auditor tax preparer will be perceived as more independent, and therefore more 
                                                 
9
 Of those participants who provided an answer to the question, 37.8% indicated concern regarding joint 
provision.  Two other participants provided the vague response “tax preparer” without a direct tie to joint 
provision concerns (2.7%).  The remaining participants provided a factor related to the financial statements, 
i.e., revenues, shareholders’ equity, etc.  The financial statements differed between Bradley’s Books and 
Sight & Sound Superstore only by a multiplier of 1.4, and the difference was counterbalanced. 
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trustworthy.  The value of being more trustworthy will be greater as aggressiveness 
increases; therefore the preference for the non-auditor tax preparer will increase as 
aggressiveness increases.  Participants indicate that the non-auditor tax preparer is both 
more trustworthy (Table 3: t = 10.788, 5.958; p = <.001, <.001)
10
 and more independent 
(t = 10.929, p = <.001).   Although the non-auditor tax preparer is perceived to be more 
trustworthy and more independent, aggressiveness does not affect the value of being 
more trustworthy and independent; the investment in the non-auditor tax preparer does 
not increase significantly as aggressiveness increases.     
H3 predicts that investors are relatively more likely to invest in a company that 
engages a non-auditor preparer when tax complexity is low than when it is high.  To test 
this hypothesis, I use a one-sided t-test to determine whether the percentage invested in a 
company engaging a non-auditor tax preparer is higher in the low complexity condition 
than in the high complexity condition.  H3 is not supported, as the mean investment in a 
company engaging a non-auditor preparer when tax complexity is low ($5,549) is lower 
than when complexity is high ($6,402).   
 H3 predicts that the mean investment in the company engaging a non-auditor 
preparer will be lower when tax complexity is high than when complexity is low.  In 
other words, the value of non-auditor preparation decreases as complexity increases.  
This argument is based on the assumption that auditor preparers benefit more than non-
auditor preparers as complexity increases due to knowledge spillover that can occur 
between audit and tax teams during joint provision.  The results of the experiment are 
                                                 
10
 Two values are provided for the t-statistic and p-value because two questions are asked to derive 
participants’ perceptions of trustworthiness: which preparer is less biased and which preparer is less 
truthful. 
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opposite to what was predicted.  The mean investment in the company engaging a non-
auditor preparer increased with greater complexity.   
The model presented in Figure 1 shows links between tax complexity, the 
importance of preparer competence, the value of knowledge spillover, and preferences 
for joint provision.  Further analysis of the data indicates that the link between 
competence and knowledge spillover does not hold.  Table 3 presents the results of post-
experimental questions in which participants indicated that they perceived the non-
auditor tax preparer as more competent than the auditor tax preparer (t = 3.905, p = 
<.001).  When asked about the components of competence, participants indicate that the 
auditor tax preparer has more client-specific knowledge (t = 3.360, p = .001) and client-
specific resources than the non-auditor tax preparer (t = 5.162, p = <.001).  These client-
specific assets relate to potential for knowledge spillover.  Therefore, participants 
indicate that knowledge spillover is possible, but they appear to dissociate knowledge 
spillover with overall competence.  When asked about knowledge of factors involved in 
general tax preparation, participants indicate no significant difference between the two 
preparer types (t = 1.546, p = .126).     
This result suggests that while investors do not appear to associate joint provision 
and the potential for knowledge spillover with greater preparer competence, the 
prediction that the value of competence increases with complexity, and that this will be 
reflected in investors’ decisions, may still be supported.  After removing the knowledge 
spillover link, an alternative form of H3 could be stated as follows: as complexity 
increases, the value of preparer competence increases, leading to a stronger preference for 
the preparer that is perceived to be more competent.  To test this alternatively stated 
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hypothesis, I use a t-test to determine whether a difference exists in perceived 
competence for auditor vs. non-auditor preparers.  On average, the non-auditor preparer 
is perceived as more competent than the auditor preparer (t = 3.905; p = <.001).  I then 
use a one-sided t-test to determine whether investment is greater in the firm engaging the 
more competent preparer when complexity is high vs. low.  The result of this test 
supports the “alternative” H3.  Investment in the preparer that is perceived to be more 
competent (the non-auditor) is significantly greater when complexity is high than when 
complexity is low (t = 1.577, p = .059).  
RQ1 explores investors’ preferences when both tax aggressiveness and 
complexity are high compared to the other three conditions.  To examine this question, I 
conduct t-tests to determine whether the amount invested in a company engaging a non-
auditor tax preparer is significantly different in the high aggressiveness, high complexity 
condition than in each of the other three conditions.  Table 2, Panel D presents the results 
of the t-tests, and Figure 2 presents the means of the four conditions.  Results indicate 
that investment is significantly higher in the high aggressiveness, high complexity 
condition ($6,717) than in the high aggressiveness, low complexity condition ($5,370) (t 
= 1.737, p = .089); but no significant difference exists between investments in the high 
aggressiveness, high complexity condition and either the low aggressiveness, high 
complexity ($6,056) (t = .907, p = .370) or low aggressiveness, low complexity condition 
($5,778) (t = 1.151, p = .257).  Although the results do not indicate a significant 
difference between the high aggressiveness, high complexity condition and each of the 
other three conditions, the means are consistent with the explanation that the cost of 
impaired independence in appearance overrides the benefit of potential knowledge 
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spillovers, as the mean investment in the non-auditor tax preparer is greater in the high 
aggressiveness, high complexity condition than in each of the other three conditions.   
In addition to the t-tests between conditions, I also use contrast coding to compare 
the four conditions.  The expectation is that participants will prefer the non-auditor tax 
preparer the most in the high aggressiveness, high complexity condition and will prefer 
the non-auditor tax preparer the least in the low aggressiveness, high complexity 
condition.  Therefore, I test the following planned contrast: 2143, wherein 
condition 1 is high aggressiveness, low complexity; condition 2 is high aggressiveness, 
high complexity; condition 3 is low aggressiveness, high complexity; and condition 4 is 
low aggressiveness, low complexity.  Untabulated results indicate that the mean 
investment in the high aggressiveness, high complexity condition ($6,717) is significantly 
greater than the mean investment in the low complexity conditions ($5,549) (t = 1.747, p 
= .042).  The mean investment in the low complexity conditions ($5,549) is not 
significantly greater than the mean investment in the low aggressiveness, high complexity 
condition ($6,056).  Again, the means are consistent with the explanation that the cost of 
impaired independence in appearance overrides the benefit of potential knowledge 
spillovers, as the mean investment in the non-auditor tax preparer is greater in the high 
aggressiveness, high complexity condition than in the conditions of low complexity.  The 
mean investment in the conditions of low complexity is not greater than the mean 
investment in the low aggressiveness, high complexity condition.  This result corresponds 
to the findings of H3; that is, high complexity leads participants to prefer the non-auditor 
tax preparer more than low complexity    
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Supplemental Analysis  
Participants were asked two questions about the relative importance of the tax 
preparer’s independence and competence.  First, participants were asked about their 
relative concern about independence and competence in general.  Then, participants were 
asked about their relative concern about the tax preparer’s independence and competence 
under joint provision.  Participants responded on a Likert-type scale with “independence” 
at “1” and competence at “7” and a midpoint of “equally concerned regarding both.”  
Table 4, Panel A presents the mean response for these two questions and the difference 
between the two responses across the aggressiveness conditions.  Table 4, Panel B 
presents the mean response for these two questions and the difference between the two 
responses across the complexity conditions.  I use a t-test to determine whether the 
difference between the two responses was significant, indicating that aggressiveness and 
complexity led to a differential shift in participants’ relative concern about independence 
and competence.  Table 4, Panel C presents the results of the t-tests.   
H2 proposes that participants’ preferences for joint provision decrease as 
aggressiveness increases, due to independence concerns.   Therefore, support for H2 
would follow from participants indicating greater relative concern about independence 
under joint provision than non-joint provision.  On average, participants in the aggressive 
conditions exhibit a greater shift in concern from competence to independence (1.42) 
than participants in the non-aggressive conditions (.85) (t = 1.514, p = .067).  In other 
words, as aggressiveness increases, participants shift the focus from competence concerns 
to independence concerns.   
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H3 proposes that participants’ preferences for joint provision increase as 
complexity increases, due to benefits from knowledge spillover.  Therefore, support for 
H3 would be evidenced by participants indicating greater relative concern about 
competence under joint provision than non-joint provision.  On average, participants do 
not exhibit a significant shift in concern from independence to competence across the 
complexity conditions (t = .271, p = .394). 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Joint provision of audit and tax services has been a subject of regulatory scrutiny 
and academic research for many years.  One problem cited in regulatory debates 
concerning the restriction of joint provision of audit and non-audit services is the lack of 
empirical evidence that joint provision leads to impaired auditor independence in fact or 
appearance (e.g., POB 2000; Turner 2001).  This study partly addresses this issue by 
providing evidence that joint provision leads to impaired independence in appearance; 
investors perceive joint provision to impair independence and prefer non-joint provision 
of audit and tax services.   
This study also contributes to the audit and tax literatures regarding the costs and 
benefits of joint provision by examining the effect of tax aggressiveness and complexity 
on investors’ preferences for joint provision.  Using a source credibility framework, I 
map the benefits and costs of joint provision to the components of source credibility, 
competence and trustworthiness, to explain the hypothesized effects of aggressiveness 
and complexity on investors’ preferences and subsequent investment decisions.   
Results of the study indicate that a tax preparer firm that is not engaged to serve 
as the auditor is perceived to be more competent and more trustworthy than a firm jointly 
providing audit and tax services.  Although the non-auditor tax preparer is perceived to 
be more trustworthy and more independent, the value of the increased trustworthiness 
and independence does not increase as tax aggressiveness increases.  Investors 
consistently prefer the non-auditor tax preparer across levels of tax aggressiveness.  In 
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other words, the non-auditor tax preparer is preferred regardless of the aggressiveness of 
the tax position; but an increasingly aggressive position does not increase the value of the 
non-auditor tax preparer’s independence.  
The non-auditor tax preparer is perceived to be more competent than the auditor 
tax preparer; and as tax complexity increases, investor preference for the non-auditor tax 
preparer increases.  In other words, the non-auditor tax preparer is preferred to the auditor 
tax preparer regardless of the complexity of the tax position.  As the tax position’s 
complexity increases, the value of the non-auditor tax preparer’s competence increases.   
One limitation of this study is the participants’ perception of “low” 
aggressiveness and complexity.  Although the aggressiveness manipulation is supported, 
low aggressiveness is actually perceived to be neutral.  Participants are asked to indicate 
how aggressive they perceive the tax position to be.  Although participants indicate that 
the tax position in the high aggressiveness condition is more aggressive than in the low 
aggressiveness condition at a statistically significant level, participants do not indicate 
that the low aggressiveness condition is different than neutral at a statistically significant 
level (t = .119, .255; p = .906, .800 for Bradley’s Books and Sight & Sound Superstore, 
respectively).  This limitation could partly explain the lack of results for H2, as the two 
levels of aggressiveness are different from one another but represent high versus neutral 
aggressiveness rather than high versus low aggressiveness.  This limitation could 
preclude observation of the full effect of aggressiveness on investors’ preferences.  
Future research could create a low aggressiveness condition in order to further address 
how aggressiveness affects investors’ preferences for joint provision.  The tax 
aggressiveness literature has posited the question of whether a company can be too 
37 
 
conservative in its tax planning strategies (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010).  A study with a 
condition of truly low aggressiveness can address whether a situation exists in which 
investors perceive a tax position as too conservative, and if so, how the overly 
conservative tax position affects perceptions of source credibility and the preference for 
joint provision.  Perceptions of low complexity were significantly less than neutral for 
Sight & Sound Superstore (t = 2.165, p = .036) but not for Bradley’s Books (t = .922, p = 
.362).  Therefore, a similar opportunity for future research examining the effect of an 
even less complex tax strategy exists.  A tax strategy that is overly simplistic may call to 
question the competence of the preparer.   
Future research could also further examine the apparent disconnect between 
competence and knowledge spillover and between competence and the specific 
components of competence.  Results of this study indicate that the non-auditor tax 
preparer is perceived to be more competent than the auditor tax preparer, regardless of 
the benefits that the auditor tax preparer receives via potential knowledge spillover.  
Participants are asked which preparer is more competent and also asked three questions 
related to components of competence, adapted from two widely accepted credibility 
scales (McCroskey 1966; Leathers 1992; Mercer 2005).  Participants indicate that the 
auditor tax preparer is perceived to have additional knowledge of client-specific factors 
involved in tax preparation, to have additional client-specific resources available for tax 
preparation, and to be more qualified to serve as the tax preparer; yet when participants 
are asked directly which preparer is more competent, they indicate that the non-auditor 
tax preparer is more competent.  Therefore, in the scenario presented, responses to the 
more detailed competence questions are inconsistent with responses to the 
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straightforward question of which preparer is more competent.  One potential explanation 
for this disconnect is that participants perceive that the non-auditor tax preparer must be 
more competent in order to earn the tax business from the client without a prior 
relationship, such as the auditor tax preparer would have.  This explanation allows for a 
separation of competence and knowledge spillover that would explain the results found in 
the study.  Future research could examine this potential explanation as well as other 
factors that could contribute to the apparent disconnect to determine whether joint 
provision, in particular, presents a unique situation in which competence is composed of 
factors that differ from those outlined in prior studies.   
An additional limitation is that participants are not asked what specific services 
the tax preparer has provided in the case.  Participants may have varying opinions of what 
the tax preparer’s responsibility and participation has been in the tax planning and 
preparation process.  Some participants may perceive the tax preparer to be an entity that 
simply completes the tax return forms by entering numbers supplied by the client.  Other 
participants may perceive the tax preparer to be an entity that is involved in planning and 
implementing tax strategies.  Because participants are randomly assigned to conditions, it 
is unlikely that differences in expectation regarding the tax preparer’s services are the 
determining factor for the results of the experiment. 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1: A Model of Tax Risk Factors and Investors’ Joint Provision Preferences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure presents the model specifying the predicted effects of two tax risk factors, complexity and 
aggressiveness, on investors’ preferences for joint provision.  Using a source credibility framework, I 
predict that tax complexity increases the importance of tax preparer competence, increasing the value of 
knowledge spillover and subsequently increasing investors’ preferences for joint provision of tax and audit 
services.  I also predict that tax aggressiveness increases the importance of tax preparer trustworthiness, 
increasing the value of independence and subsequently decreasing investors’ preferences for joint provision 
of tax and audit services. 
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Figure 2: Graphed Results 
 
 
This figure represents the observed effects of aggressiveness and complexity on investors’ preferences for 
joint provision.  In the experiment, participants allocate a hypothetical $10,000 investment between a firm 
engaging its auditor as the tax preparer and a firm engaging a non-auditor preparer as the tax preparer.  The 
dollar amount invested in the firm engaging a non-auditor preparer represents investors’ preference for 
joint provision of tax and audit services.  Aggressiveness and complexity are manipulated between-subjects 
in the experiment at two levels: low and high.   
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Table 1: Hypothesized Effects of Aggressiveness and Complexity on Independence 
and Knowledge Spillover 
 Complexity 
Low High 
Aggressiveness 
Low Independence: No effect 
Knowledge spillover: No effect 
Independence: No effect 
Knowledge spillover: Increase 
High Independence: Decrease 
Knowledge spillover: No effect 
Independence: Decrease 
Knowledge spillover: Increase 
 
This figure represents the predicted effects of the tax risk factors aggressiveness and complexity on 
independence and knowledge spillover.  In the high aggressiveness, high complexity cell, aggressiveness 
and complexity present opposing effects on the value of the auditor tax preparer.  The auditor tax preparer 
is at a disadvantage compared to the non-auditor tax preparer due to concerns regarding independence and 
has an advantage compared to the non-auditor tax preparer due to benefits arising from knowledge 
spillover.  These competing effects lead to RQ1. 
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Table 2. The Effect of Aggressiveness and Complexity on Investors’ Preference for 
Joint Provision of Tax and Audit Services 
a
 
 
Panel A: Amount invested in company engaging the non-auditor tax preparer 
(mean [standard deviation]): 
 
Condition Low Complexity High Complexity Total 
Low 
Aggressiveness 
5,777.78 
[2,550.79] 
n = 18 
6,055.52 
[2,163.66] 
n = 21 
5,927.33 
[2,322.59] 
n = 39 
High 
Aggressiveness 
5,369.57 
[2,633.77] 
n = 23 
6,717.39 
[2,627.76] 
n = 23 
6,043.48 
[2,689.13] 
n = 46 
Total 5,548.78 
[2,576.43] 
n = 41 
6,401.50 
[2,412.91] 
n = 44 
5,990.19 
[2,513.50] 
n = 85 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA Results: Amount invested in company engaging the non-auditor 
tax preparer: 
 
 df MSE F-statistic p-value 
Aggressiveness 1 284,710.84 .045 .832 
Complexity 1 15,616,461.82 2.486 .119 
Aggressiveness x Complexity 1 6,022,534.84 .959 .330 
Error 81 6,281,008.22   
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Table 2 (cont.) 
Panel C: t-tests with amount invested in company engaging the non-auditor tax 
preparer as the independent variable: 
 t-statistic p-value 
H1: Investors are more likely to invest in a company engaging a 
non-auditor tax preparer than a company engaging an auditor 
tax preparer. 
 
3.632 
 
< .001 
H2: Investors’ relative preferences for a firm engaging a non-
auditor tax preparer is greater when tax aggressiveness is high 
than when it is low. 
 
.211 
 
.417 
H3: Investors’ relative preferences for a firm engaging a non-
auditor tax preparer are greater when tax complexity is low than 
when it is high. 
 
1.577 
 
.059 
 
 
Panel D: t-tests for RQ comparing high aggressive/high complexity condition to 
other three conditions: 
RQ1: What is the combined effect of high aggressiveness and high complexity on 
investors’ relative preference for a firm engaging an auditor versus non-auditor tax 
preparer? 
High Aggressiveness/High Complexity compared to: t-statistic p-value 
High Aggressiveness/Low Complexity 1.737 .089 
Low Aggressiveness/High Complexity .907 .370 
Low Aggressiveness/Low Complexity 1.151 .257 
 
a Participants allocated a $10,000 investment between Bradley’s Books and Sight & Sound Superstore.  The 
investment decision dependent measure is the amount of $10,000 invested in Bradley’s Books.  Bradley’s 
Books engaged a non-auditor tax preparer.  Sight & Sound Superstore engaged its auditor as the tax 
preparer.  The amount invested in Sight & Sound Suuperstore is $10,000 less the amount invested in 
Bradley’s Books.    
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Results for Tests Regarding Source Credibility 
Questions 
Panel A: Response to Likert-type questions with non-auditor tax preparer at “1” 
and auditor tax preparer at “7”: 
 
 Mean N Std. Deviation 
More competent 3.46 85 1.278 
More likely to have additional knowledge of general tax 
preparation 
a
 
4.24 85 1.403 
More likely to have additional client-specific knowledge 
a
 4.68 85 1.872 
More likely to have additional client-specific resources 
a
 5.00 85 1.786 
More qualified to serve as the tax preparer 
a
 3.65 84 1.410 
More independent 2.21 84 1.498 
Less biased 
b
 2.21 85 1.528 
Less truthful 
b
 5.20 85 1.857 
More credible 2.79 85 1.390 
a
 These questions relate to specific aspects of competence. 
b
 These questions relate to specific aspects of trustworthiness. 
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Panel B: t-tests for determining whether the mean response is significantly different 
than “neutral”: 
 
 t-statistic p-value a 
Q1: Which of the two tax preparers is more competent in your 
judgment? 
 
 
-3.905 
 
< .001 
Q2:  Which of the two preparers is more likely to have 
additional knowledge of the factors involved in general tax 
preparation? b 
 
1.546 
 
.126 
Q3: Which of the two preparers is more likely to have 
additional knowledge of client-specific factors involved in tax 
preparation? b 
 
3.360 
 
.001 
Q4: Which of the two preparers is more likely to have 
additional client-specific resources available for tax 
preparation? b 
 
5.162 
 
< .001 
Q9: Which firm is more qualified to serve as the tax preparer 
for its respective client? b 
 
 
-2.244 
 
.027 
Q5: Which of the two preparers is more independent?  
-10.929 
 
 
< .001 
Q6: Which of the two preparers is less biased in tax preparation 
and reporting? 
c
 
 
-10.788 
 
 
< .001 
Q7: Which of the two tax preparers is less likely to be truthful 
in their tax planning, preparation, and reporting? 
c
 
 
5.958 
 
 
< .001 
Q8: Which of the two preparers is more credible? 
c
  
-8.040 
 
 
< .001 
 
a
 p-values are two-tailed.   
b
 These questions relate to specific aspects of competence. 
c 
These questions relate to specific aspects of trustworthiness. 
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Table 4: Mean response for relative concern about independence and competence of 
tax preparer 
 
Panel A: Results for comparing across high and low aggressiveness conditions: 
 
 General concern Concern under 
joint provision 
Difference 
 
Low Aggressiveness 
4.33 
n = 39 
[1.628] 
3.49 
n = 39 
[2.037] 
.85 
n = 39 
[1.531] 
 
High Aggressiveness 
4.56 
n = 45 
[1.589] 
3.13 
n = 45 
[1.804] 
1.42 
n = 45 
[1.901] 
 
 
Panel B: Results for comparing across complex and not aggressive conditions: 
 
 General concern Concern under 
joint provision 
Difference 
 
Low Complexity 
4.50 
n = 40 
[1.881] 
3.40 
n = 40 
[1.985] 
1.10 
n = 40 
[1.582] 
 
High Complexity 
4.41 
n = 44 
[1.317] 
3.20 
n = 44 
[1.862] 
1.20 
n = 44 
[1.912] 
 
 
Panel C: t-tests to determine whether participants show a significant shift in focus 
between independence and competence   
 
 t-statistic p-value 
a
 
 
Aggressiveness 
 
 
1.514 
 
.067 
 
Complexity 
 
 
.271 
 
.394 
 
a
 One-tailed p-values are reported as a directional prediction is made regarding the shift in focus between 
independence and competence. 
 
These tables represent mean responses to the following questions: “In general, are you relatively more 
concerned about the independence of the tax preparer or the competence of the tax preparer?” and “When 
the same accounting firm is providing both audit and tax services, are you more concerned about the 
independence of the tax preparer or the competence of the tax preparer?”  Participants responded to the 
question on a scale from “1 – Independence” to “7 – Competence” with a midpoint of “4 – Equally 
concerned regarding both.”   
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APPENDIX A: SOURCE CREDIBILITY QUESTIONS 
Q1: Which of the two tax preparers is more competent in your judgment? 
Q2: Which of the two tax preparers is more likely to have additional knowledge of the 
factors involved in general tax preparation? 
Q3: Which of the two tax preparers is more likely to have additional knowledge of client-
specific factors involved in tax preparation? 
Q4: Which of the two tax preparers is more likely to have additional client-specific 
resources available for tax preparation? 
Q5: Which of the two tax preparers is more independent? 
Q6: Which of the two tax preparers is less biased in tax preparation and reporting? 
Q7: Which of the two tax preparers is less likely to be truthful in their tax planning, 
preparation, and reporting? 
Q8: Which of the two tax preparers is more credible? 
Q9: Which firm is more qualified to serve as the tax preparer for its respective client? 
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APPENDIX B: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT 
HIGH AGGRESSIVENESS, HIGH COMPLEXITY CONDITION 
 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
As a potential investor, you have obtained the following background information from 
the 2010 annual reports of Bradley’s Books and Sight and Sound Superstore.  Additional 
information has been provided for your consideration as well.  Please review both sets of 
information before answering the case questions.   
 
 
 
Bradley’s Books 
Business and Products 
Bradley’s Books, a publicly traded, Fortune 500 company (BDB), operates book and 
music superstores.  At December 31, 2010, Bradley’s Books operated 350 superstores in 
the United States.  In addition, Bradley’s Books operates a proprietary e-commerce Web 
site, www.BradleysBooks.com, which was launched in 2007. 
Bradley’s Books’ business strategy is designed to address the most significant 
opportunities and challenges facing the Company. In particular, challenges include 
commoditization in primary product categories, an extremely competitive marketplace 
(including both store-based and online competitors), the seasonal nature of sales as a 
retailer, and product formats that are evolving from physical to digital formats. 
 
Significant Accounting Policies 
In accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), revenue is 
recognized when earned.  In preparing financial statements in conformity with GAAP, 
the Company is required to make estimates and assumptions that affect the reported 
amounts of assets and liabilities and the disclosure of contingent assets and liabilities at 
the date of the financial statements and revenues and expenses during the reporting 
period. Actual results could differ from those estimates. 
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Income Statement (all figures in millions) 
Fiscal Year ending December 31 
 
 AUDITED 
 2009 2010 
Revenue $51.00 $61.00 
Cost of Sales  25.40   30.50 
Gross Profit  25.60   30.50 
Lease Expense    4.90     5.80 
Selling, General & Administrative Expense  12.50   14.80 
Earnings Before Income Taxes   8.20    9.90 
Income Tax Expense   2.20    2.60 
Net Income $6.00   $7.30 
 
 
Balance Sheet (all figures in millions) 
Fiscal Year ending December 31 
 AUDITED 
 2009 2010 
Assets   
Current Assets $17.2 $19.6 
Property, Plant, and Equipment     8.2     8.1 
Intangible Assets     2.4     2.4 
Other Assets     2.1     2.4 
     Total Assets    29.9    32.5 
   
Liabilities   
Current Liabilities $14.8 $15.9 
Long-term Liabilities     5.9     5.9 
     Total Liabilities   20.7   21.8 
   
Stockholders’ Equity     9.2   10.7 
     Total Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity   29.9   32.5 
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Additional information: 
 Bradley’s Books’ effective tax rate for 2010 was 26.3%.  The industry average 
effective tax rate was 26.8%.   
 
 During 2010, Bradley’s Books engaged in an innovative tax transaction that 
reduced the firm’s effective tax rate from 26.8% in 2009 to 26.3% in 2010.  This 
transaction is captured in the tax reserve liability (unrecognized tax benefit).  This 
transaction’s legitimacy is pending before the IRS, and it is uncertain whether the 
position will be sustained upon IRS audit.      
 
 Some of the tax planning for Bradley’s Books involved complex tax positions and 
strategies, which required careful structuring and an in-depth understanding of 
relevant, interacting factors from the financial statements and tax records.   
 
 Bradley’s Books has engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, as the tax preparer.  Crandall 
Hedge, LLP, will only provide tax services to Bradley’s Books.  Crandall Hedge, 
LLP, is a Big 4 public accounting firm.   
 
 Bradley’s Books has engaged Burton & Olde, LLP, also a Big 4 public 
accounting firm, to serve as the external auditor. 
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Please answer the following questions by marking the circle that corresponds to 
your judgment.  Feel free to refer back to the case materials in order to answer the 
questions. 
Q1: How aggressive do you believe the tax position taken by the company is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Extremely 
unaggressive 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
aggressive 
 
 
 
Q2: How complex do you believe the company’s tax planning is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not 
complex at 
all  
2 3 4 
Somewhat 
complex 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
complex 
 
 
Q3: Which of the following best describes Bradley’s Books? 
A. Bradley’s Books is a small, privately owned company, operating a handful of 
bookstores. 
 
B. Bradley’s Books is a large, publicly traded company, operating many 
bookstores. 
 
C. The information is not provided in the case. 
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Q4:  Which of the following is true regarding the tax preparer engaged by Bradley’s 
Books?  Remember: You may look back over the case materials to determine the correct 
answer. 
A. Bradley’s Books has engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, a Big 4 public accounting 
firm, to provide BOTH tax and audit services.   
B. Bradley’s Books has engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, a Big 4 public accounting 
firm, to provide ONLY tax services and has engaged Burton & Olde, LLP, to 
provide audit services.   
C. Bradley’s Books has engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, which is NOT a Big 4 
public accounting firm, to provide BOTH tax and audit services.   
D. Bradley’s Books has engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, which is NOT a Big 4 
public accounting firm, to provide ONLY tax services and has engaged 
Burton & Olde, LLP, to provide audit services.   
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Sight and Sound Superstore 
Business and Products 
Sight and Sound Superstore, a publicly traded, Fortune 500 company (SSS), operates 
book and music superstores.  At December 31, 2010, Sight and Sound Superstore 
operated 350 superstores in the United States.  In addition, Sight and Sound Superstore 
operates a proprietary e-commerce Web site, www.SandSSuperstore.com, which was 
launched in 2007. 
Sight and Sound Superstore’ business strategy is designed to address the most significant 
opportunities and challenges facing the Company. In particular, challenges include 
commoditization in primary product categories, an extremely competitive marketplace 
(including both store-based and online competitors), the seasonal nature of sales as a 
retailer, and product formats that are evolving from physical to digital formats. 
 
Significant Accounting Policies 
In accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), revenue is 
recognized when earned.  In preparing financial statements in conformity with GAAP, 
the Company is required to make estimates and assumptions that affect the reported 
amounts of assets and liabilities and the disclosure of contingent assets and liabilities at 
the date of the financial statements and revenues and expenses during the reporting 
period. Actual results could differ from those estimates. 
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Income Statement (all figures in millions) 
Fiscal Year ending December 31 
 
 AUDITED 
 2009 2010 
Revenue $71.40 $85.40 
Cost of Sales   35.56   42.70 
Gross Profit   35.84   42.70 
Lease Expense     6.86     8.12 
Selling, General & Administrative Expense   17.50   20.72 
Earnings Before Income Taxes   11.48    13.86 
Income Tax Expense     3.08      3.65 
Net Income   $8.40   $10.21 
 
 
Balance Sheet (all figures in millions) 
Fiscal Year ending December 31 
 AUDITED 
 2009 2010 
Assets   
Current Assets $ 24.08 $27.44 
Property, Plant, and Equipment    11.48    11.34 
Intangible Assets      3.36     3.36 
Other Assets      2.94     3.36 
     Total Assets    41.86    45.50 
   
Liabilities   
Current Liabilities $20.72 $22.26 
Long-term Liabilities     8.26     8.26 
     Total Liabilities   28.98   30.52 
   
Stockholders’ Equity   12.88   14.98 
     Total Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity   41.86   45.50 
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Additional information: 
 Sight and Sound Superstore’s effective tax rate for 2010 was 26.3%.  The industry 
average effective tax rate was 26.8%. 
 
 During 2010, Sight and Sound Superstore engaged in an innovative tax 
transaction that reduced the firm’s effective tax rate from 26.8% in 2009 to 26.3% 
in 2010.  This transaction is captured in the tax reserve liability (unrecognized tax 
benefit).  This transaction’s legitimacy is pending before the IRS, and it is 
uncertain whether the position will be sustained upon IRS audit.  
 
 Some of the tax planning for Sight and Sound Superstore involved complex tax 
positions and strategies, which required careful structuring and an in-depth 
understanding of relevant, interacting factors from the financial statements and 
tax records. 
 
 Sight and Sound Superstore has engaged Livingston, LLP, as the tax preparer.  
Livingston, LLP, is a Big 4 public accounting firm.  Sight and Sound Superstore 
has engaged Livingston, LLP, to also serve as the external auditor. 
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Q5: How aggressive do you believe the tax position taken by the company is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Extremely 
unaggressive 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
aggressive 
 
 
Q6: How complex do you believe the company’s tax planning is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not 
complex at 
all  
2 3 4 
Somewhat 
complex 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
complex 
 
 
Q7: Which of the following best describes Sight and Sound Superstore? 
A. Sight and Sound Superstore is a small, privately owned company, operating a 
handful of bookstores. 
 
B. Sight and Sound Superstore is a large, publicly traded company, operating 
many bookstores. 
 
C. The information is not provided in the case. 
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Q8:  Which of the following is true regarding the tax preparer engaged by Sight and 
Sound Superstore?  Remember: You may look back over the case materials to determine 
the correct answer. 
A. Sight and Sound Superstore has engaged Livingston, LLP, a Big 4 public 
accounting firm, to provide BOTH tax and audit services.   
B. Sight and Sound Superstore has engaged Livingston, LLP, a Big 4 public 
accounting firm, to provide ONLY tax services and has engaged SAIB, LLP, 
to provide audit services.   
C. Sight and Sound Superstore has engaged Livingston, LLP, which is NOT a 
Big 4 public accounting firm, to provide BOTH tax and audit services.   
D. Sight and Sound Superstore has engaged Livingston, LLP, which is NOT a 
Big 4 public accounting firm, to provide ONLY tax services and has engaged 
SAIB, LLP, to provide audit services.   
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INSTRUCTIONS 
 After reviewing the background information provided above for Bradley’s Books 
and Sight and Sound Superstore, please answer the following questions by 
providing an answer that best indicates your judgment.  You may refer back to the 
case materials in answering the questions. 
 
 After you have answered a question, please do not go back and change your 
response. 
 
 
Q9:  Please allocate a $10,000 investment between Bradley’s Books and Sight and 
Sound Superstore in the space provided.  Please confirm that your total equals 
$10,000. 
Amount allocated to Bradley’s Books: _____________________________ 
 
Amount allocated to Sight and Sound Superstore: ______________________ 
 
 
Q10: What is the single most important factor you considered in support of your 
investment allocation? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
63 
 
Q11: If the tax preparer had an effect on your investment decision, please rank the 
following factors by the importance each played in your decision for which company you 
prefer. 
A. Client-specific competence 
B. General competence 
C. Independence 
D. Other factors __________________ 
 
1.  
2. 
3. 
4. 
 
 
If you would like to provide a justification for your decisions, please feel free to do 
so in the space provided below. 
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Q12: Please indicate on the scale below how attractive you believe Bradley’s Books is as 
a potential investment. 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not at all 
attractive 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Very 
Attractive 
 
 
Q13: Please indicate on the scale below how attractive you believe Sight and Sound 
Superstore is as a potential investment. 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not at all 
attractive 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Very 
Attractive 
 
 
 
When done, please return the completed materials to Envelope #1, and open 
Envelope #2. 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
 Please answer the following questions by circling the letter or checking the circle 
that corresponds to your personal judgment. 
 
 Please answer the questions in the order presented, and please do not read ahead. 
 
 After you have answered a question, please do not go back and change your 
response. 
 
 
As a reminder: 
 Both Bradley’s Books’ and Sight and Sound Superstore had an effective tax rate 
of 26.3% for 2010.  The industry average effective tax rate was 26.8%. 
 Both Bradley’s Books and Sight and Sound Superstore engaged in an innovative 
tax transaction which reduced the firm’s effective tax rates from 2009 to 2010.  
The transaction was captured in the tax reserve liability (unrecognized tax 
benefit).  The transaction’s legitimacy is pending before the IRS, and it is 
uncertain whether the position will be sustained upon IRS audit. 
 Some of the tax planning for Bradley’s Books and Sight and Sound Superstore 
involved complex tax positions and strategies, which required careful structuring 
and an in-depth understanding of relevant, interacting factors from the financial 
statements and tax records. 
 
 Bradley’s Books engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, a Big 4 public accounting firm, 
to provide tax services.  Bradley’s Books engaged Burton & Olde, LLP, also a 
Big 4 public accounting firm, to serve as the external auditor. 
 
 Sight and Sound Superstore engaged Livingston, LLP, a Big 4 public accounting 
firm to provide both tax and audit services.   
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Q1:  Which of the two tax preparers is more competent in your judgment? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are equally 
competent 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q2:  Which of the two preparers is more likely to have additional knowledge of the 
factors involved in general tax preparation? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
have equal 
general tax 
knowledge 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
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Q3:  Which of the two preparers is more likely to have additional knowledge of client-
specific factors involved in tax preparation? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
have equal 
client-
specific tax 
knowledge 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q4:  Which of the two preparers is more likely to have additional client-specific 
resources available for tax preparation? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
have equal 
resources 
available 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
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Q5:  Which of the two preparers is more independent? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are equally 
independent 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q6:  Which of the two preparers is less biased in tax preparation and reporting? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are equally 
biased or 
unbiased 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q7:  Which of the two preparers is less likely to be truthful in their tax planning, 
preparation, and reporting? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are equally 
truthful 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
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Q8:  Which of the two preparers is more credible? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are equally 
credible 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q9:  Which firm is more qualified to serve as the tax preparer for its respective client? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, 
LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are 
equally 
qualified 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
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Q10:  The cost associated with a loss of reputation due to performing the tax planning 
and preparation work poorly is higher for… 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
Neither.  
The cost is 
the same 
for both 
preparers 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q11:  Bradley’s Books’ management is credible. 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Completely 
Disagree 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Completely 
Agree 
 
 
Q12:  Sight and Sound Superstore’s management is credible. 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Completely 
Disagree 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Completely 
Agree 
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Q13: How risky do you believe the tax position taken by Bradley’s Books is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not risky 
at all 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
risky 
 
 
Q14: If you perceive the tax position is risky, to what factor do you attribute the risk? 
 
 
 
Q15: How risky do you believe the tax position taken by Sight and Sound Superstore is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not risky 
at all 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
risky 
 
 
Q16: If you perceive the tax position is risky, to what factor do you attribute the risk? 
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Please answer the following questions according to your general opinion (not 
specifically related to the case provided). 
Q17:  In general, are you relatively more concerned about the independence of the tax 
preparer or the competence of the tax preparer? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Independence 
2 3 4 
Equally 
concerned 
regarding 
both 
5 6 7 
Competence 
 
 
Q18:  When the same accounting firm is providing both audit and tax services, are you 
more concerned about the independence of the tax preparer or the competence of the tax 
preparer? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Independence 
2 3 4 
Equally 
concerned 
regarding 
both 
5 6 7 
Competence 
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Q19: When comparing two firms, one which has engaged a single accounting firm to 
jointly provide both tax and audit services and one which has engaged two separate 
accounting firms to provide tax and audit services, does your relative concern for 
independence or competence change?  In other words, how would you complete the 
following sentences: 
When one firm provides both tax and audit services, I am _____________________ than 
when separate firms provide tax and audit services.   
A. More concerned about independence 
B. Less concerned about independence 
C. No more or less concerned about independence 
 
When one firm provides both tax and audit services, I am _____________________ than 
when separate firms provide tax and audit services. 
A. More concerned about competence 
B. Less concerned about competence 
C. No more or less concerned about competence 
 
Q20:  In general, the cost associated with a loss of reputation due to performing the tax 
planning and preparation work poorly is… 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Higher for 
the auditor 
tax preparer 
2 3 4 
The same for 
both entities 
5 6 7 
Higher for 
the non-
auditor tax 
preparer 
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Q21: To what extent do you believe the joint provision of tax and audit services by an 
auditor impairs auditor independence?  
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Auditor 
independence 
is not 
impaired 
2 3 4 
 Neutral 
5 6 7 
Auditor 
independence 
is severely 
impaired 
 
 
Q22: To what extent do you believe the joint provision of tax and audit services by an 
auditor affects the quality of a firm’s tax services?  
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Tax quality 
is much 
lower 
2 3 4 
No effect 
on tax 
quality 
5 6 7 
Tax quality 
is much 
higher 
 
 
Q23: To what extent do you believe the joint provision of tax and audit services by an 
auditor affects financial reporting quality? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Financial 
reporting 
quality is 
much 
lower 
2 3 4 
No effect 
on 
financial 
reporting 
quality 
5 6 7 
Financial 
reporting 
quality is 
much 
higher 
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Q24: To what extent do you believe the joint provision of tax and audit services by an 
auditor affects audit quality?  
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Audit 
quality is 
much 
lower 
2 3 4 
No effect 
on audit 
quality 
5 6 7 
Audit 
quality is 
much 
higher 
 
 
Q25: How important do you consider tax policy to be when evaluating a potential 
investment in general?  
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not 
important 
at all 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
important 
 
 
Q26: Do you think your thoughts about a firm engaging one accounting firm to provide 
both tax and audit services would be different if you were a current shareholder rather 
than a potential shareholder?  Please explain. 
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Q27: What is your current profession? 
 
 
 
Q28: How many years’ experience do you have in your current position? 
A. Less than 1 year 
B. 1 year to less than 3 years 
C. 3 years to less than 5 years 
D. More than 5 years 
 
Q29: How much experience do you have as a tax professional (answer in years or months 
of tax experience)? 
 
________________ 
 
 
Q30: Do you have personal experience buying or selling an individual company’s 
common stock or debt securities (not through a mutual or pension fund?) 
A. Yes 
 
B. No 
 
 
Q31.  Do you intend to invest in an individual company’s common stock or debt 
securities in the next five years? 
A. Yes 
 
B. No 
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Q32: How familiar are you with FIN 48 and/or Unrecognized Tax Benefits? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Very 
unfamiliar 
2 3 4 
Somewhat 
familiar 
5 6 7 
Very 
familiar 
 
 
Q33: Do you think the reserve for Unrecognized Tax Benefit is a signal of earnings 
management? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Absolutely 
not 
2 3 4 
Unsure 
5 6 7 
Absolutely 
 
Q34: In which graduate program are you currently enrolled? ______________________ 
 
YOU ARE FINISHED. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION. 
PLEASE PLACE THESE COMPLETED MATERIALS IN ENVELOPE #2, AND 
RETURN ALL ENVELOPES TO THE RESEARCHER. 
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HIGH AGGRESSIVENESS, LOW COMPLEXITY CONDITION 
 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
As a potential investor, you have obtained the following background information from 
the 2010 annual reports of Bradley’s Books and Sight and Sound Superstore.  Additional 
information has been provided for your consideration as well.  Please review both sets of 
information before answering the case questions.   
 
 
 
Bradley’s Books 
Business and Products 
Bradley’s Books, a publicly traded, Fortune 500 company (BDB), operates book and 
music superstores.  At December 31, 2010, Bradley’s Books operated 350 superstores in 
the United States.  In addition, Bradley’s Books operates a proprietary e-commerce Web 
site, www.BradleysBooks.com, which was launched in 2007. 
Bradley’s Books’ business strategy is designed to address the most significant 
opportunities and challenges facing the Company. In particular, challenges include 
commoditization in primary product categories, an extremely competitive marketplace 
(including both store-based and online competitors), the seasonal nature of sales as a 
retailer, and product formats that are evolving from physical to digital formats. 
 
Significant Accounting Policies 
In accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), revenue is 
recognized when earned.  In preparing financial statements in conformity with GAAP, 
the Company is required to make estimates and assumptions that affect the reported 
amounts of assets and liabilities and the disclosure of contingent assets and liabilities at 
the date of the financial statements and revenues and expenses during the reporting 
period. Actual results could differ from those estimates. 
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Income Statement (all figures in millions) 
Fiscal Year ending December 31 
 
 AUDITED 
 2009 2010 
Revenue $51.00 $61.00 
Cost of Sales  25.40   30.50 
Gross Profit  25.60   30.50 
Lease Expense    4.90     5.80 
Selling, General & Administrative Expense  12.50   14.80 
Earnings Before Income Taxes   8.20    9.90 
Income Tax Expense   2.20    2.60 
Net Income $6.00   $7.30 
 
 
Balance Sheet (all figures in millions) 
Fiscal Year ending December 31 
 AUDITED 
 2009 2010 
Assets   
Current Assets $17.2 $19.6 
Property, Plant, and Equipment     8.2     8.1 
Intangible Assets     2.4     2.4 
Other Assets     2.1     2.4 
     Total Assets    29.9    32.5 
   
Liabilities   
Current Liabilities $14.8 $15.9 
Long-term Liabilities     5.9     5.9 
     Total Liabilities   20.7   21.8 
   
Stockholders’ Equity     9.2   10.7 
     Total Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity   29.9   32.5 
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Additional information: 
 Bradley’s Books’ effective tax rate for 2010 was 26.3%.  The industry average 
effective tax rate was 26.8%.   
 
 During 2010, Bradley’s Books engaged in an innovative tax transaction that 
reduced the firm’s effective tax rate from 26.8% in 2009 to 26.3% in 2010.  This 
transaction is captured in the tax reserve liability (unrecognized tax benefit).  This 
transaction’s legitimacy is pending before the IRS, and it is uncertain whether the 
position will be sustained upon IRS audit.      
 
 The tax planning for Bradley’s Books is relatively straightforward, involving 
uncomplicated tax positions and strategies. 
 
 Bradley’s Books has engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, as the tax preparer.  Crandall 
Hedge, LLP, will only provide tax services to Bradley’s Books.  Crandall Hedge, 
LLP, is a Big 4 public accounting firm.   
 
 Bradley’s Books has engaged Burton & Olde, LLP, also a Big 4 public 
accounting firm, to serve as the external auditor. 
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Please answer the following questions by marking the circle that corresponds to 
your judgment.  Feel free to refer back to the case materials in order to answer the 
questions. 
Q1: How aggressive do you believe the tax position taken by the company is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Extremely 
unaggressive 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
aggressive 
 
 
 
Q2: How complex do you believe the company’s tax planning is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not 
complex at 
all  
2 3 4 
Somewhat 
complex 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
complex 
 
 
Q3: Which of the following best describes Bradley’s Books? 
A. Bradley’s Books is a small, privately owned company, operating a handful of 
bookstores. 
 
B. Bradley’s Books is a large, publicly traded company, operating many 
bookstores. 
 
C. The information is not provided in the case. 
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Q4:  Which of the following is true regarding the tax preparer engaged by Bradley’s 
Books?  Remember: You may look back over the case materials to determine the correct 
answer. 
A. Bradley’s Books has engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, a Big 4 public accounting 
firm, to provide BOTH tax and audit services.   
B. Bradley’s Books has engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, a Big 4 public accounting 
firm, to provide ONLY tax services and has engaged Burton & Olde, LLP, to 
provide audit services.   
C. Bradley’s Books has engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, which is NOT a Big 4 
public accounting firm, to provide BOTH tax and audit services.   
D. Bradley’s Books has engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, which is NOT a Big 4 
public accounting firm, to provide ONLY tax services and has engaged 
Burton & Olde, LLP, to provide audit services.   
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Sight and Sound Superstore 
Business and Products 
Sight and Sound Superstore, a publicly traded, Fortune 500 company (SSS), operates 
book and music superstores.  At December 31, 2010, Sight and Sound Superstore 
operated 350 superstores in the United States.  In addition, Sight and Sound Superstore 
operates a proprietary e-commerce Web site, www.SandSSuperstore.com, which was 
launched in 2007. 
Sight and Sound Superstore’ business strategy is designed to address the most significant 
opportunities and challenges facing the Company. In particular, challenges include 
commoditization in primary product categories, an extremely competitive marketplace 
(including both store-based and online competitors), the seasonal nature of sales as a 
retailer, and product formats that are evolving from physical to digital formats. 
 
Significant Accounting Policies 
In accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), revenue is 
recognized when earned.  In preparing financial statements in conformity with GAAP, 
the Company is required to make estimates and assumptions that affect the reported 
amounts of assets and liabilities and the disclosure of contingent assets and liabilities at 
the date of the financial statements and revenues and expenses during the reporting 
period. Actual results could differ from those estimates. 
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Income Statement (all figures in millions) 
Fiscal Year ending December 31 
 
 AUDITED 
 2009 2010 
Revenue $71.40 $85.40 
Cost of Sales   35.56   42.70 
Gross Profit   35.84   42.70 
Lease Expense     6.86     8.12 
Selling, General & Administrative Expense   17.50   20.72 
Earnings Before Income Taxes   11.48    13.86 
Income Tax Expense     3.08      3.65 
Net Income   $8.40   $10.21 
 
 
Balance Sheet (all figures in millions) 
Fiscal Year ending December 31 
 AUDITED 
 2009 2010 
Assets   
Current Assets $ 24.08 $27.44 
Property, Plant, and Equipment    11.48    11.34 
Intangible Assets      3.36     3.36 
Other Assets      2.94     3.36 
     Total Assets    41.86    45.50 
   
Liabilities   
Current Liabilities $20.72 $22.26 
Long-term Liabilities     8.26     8.26 
     Total Liabilities   28.98   30.52 
   
Stockholders’ Equity   12.88   14.98 
     Total Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity   41.86   45.50 
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Additional information: 
 Sight and Sound Superstore’s effective tax rate for 2010 was 26.3%.  The industry 
average effective tax rate was 26.8%. 
 
 During 2010, Sight and Sound Superstore engaged in an innovative tax 
transaction that reduced the firm’s effective tax rate from 26.8% in 2009 to 26.3% 
in 2010.  This transaction is captured in the tax reserve liability (unrecognized tax 
benefit).  This transaction’s legitimacy is pending before the IRS, and it is 
uncertain whether the position will be sustained upon IRS audit.  
 
 The tax planning for Sight and Sound Superstore is relatively straightforward, 
involving uncomplicated tax positions and strategies. 
 
 Sight and Sound Superstore has engaged Livingston, LLP, as the tax preparer.  
Livingston, LLP, is a Big 4 public accounting firm.  Sight and Sound Superstore 
has engaged Livingston, LLP, to also serve as the external auditor. 
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Q5: How aggressive do you believe the tax position taken by the company is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Extremely 
unaggressive 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
aggressive 
 
 
Q6: How complex do you believe the company’s tax planning is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not 
complex at 
all  
2 3 4 
Somewhat 
complex 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
complex 
 
 
Q7: Which of the following best describes Sight and Sound Superstore? 
A. Sight and Sound Superstore is a small, privately owned company, operating a 
handful of bookstores. 
 
B. Sight and Sound Superstore is a large, publicly traded company, operating 
many bookstores. 
 
C. The information is not provided in the case. 
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Q8:  Which of the following is true regarding the tax preparer engaged by Sight and 
Sound Superstore?  Remember: You may look back over the case materials to determine 
the correct answer. 
A. Sight and Sound Superstore has engaged Livingston, LLP, a Big 4 public 
accounting firm, to provide BOTH tax and audit services.   
B. Sight and Sound Superstore has engaged Livingston, LLP, a Big 4 public 
accounting firm, to provide ONLY tax services and has engaged SAIB, LLP, 
to provide audit services.   
C. Sight and Sound Superstore has engaged Livingston, LLP, which is NOT a 
Big 4 public accounting firm, to provide BOTH tax and audit services.   
D. Sight and Sound Superstore has engaged Livingston, LLP, which is NOT a 
Big 4 public accounting firm, to provide ONLY tax services and has engaged 
SAIB, LLP, to provide audit services.   
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INSTRUCTIONS 
 After reviewing the background information provided above for Bradley’s Books 
and Sight and Sound Superstore, please answer the following questions by 
providing an answer that best indicates your judgment.  You may refer back to the 
case materials in answering the questions. 
 
 After you have answered a question, please do not go back and change your 
response. 
 
 
Q9:  Please allocate a $10,000 investment between Bradley’s Books and Sight and 
Sound Superstore in the space provided.  Please confirm that your total equals 
$10,000. 
Amount allocated to Bradley’s Books: _____________________________ 
 
Amount allocated to Sight and Sound Superstore: ______________________ 
 
 
Q10: What is the single most important factor you considered in support of your 
investment allocation? 
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Q11: If the tax preparer had an effect on your investment decision, please rank the 
following factors by the importance each played in your decision for which company you 
prefer. 
A. Client-specific competence 
B. General competence 
C. Independence 
D. Other factors __________________ 
 
1.  
2. 
3. 
4. 
 
 
If you would like to provide a justification for your decisions, please feel free to do 
so in the space provided below. 
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Q12: Please indicate on the scale below how attractive you believe Bradley’s Books is as 
a potential investment. 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not at all 
attractive 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Very 
Attractive 
 
 
Q13: Please indicate on the scale below how attractive you believe Sight and Sound 
Superstore is as a potential investment. 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not at all 
attractive 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Very 
Attractive 
 
 
 
When done, please return the completed materials to Envelope #1, and open 
Envelope #2. 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
 Please answer the following questions by circling the letter or checking the circle 
that corresponds to your personal judgment. 
 
 Please answer the questions in the order presented, and please do not read ahead. 
 
 After you have answered a question, please do not go back and change your 
response. 
 
 
As a reminder: 
 Both Bradley’s Books’ and Sight and Sound Superstore had an effective tax rate 
of 26.3% for 2010.  The industry average effective tax rate was 26.8%. 
 Both Bradley’s Books and Sight and Sound Superstore engaged in an innovative 
tax transaction which reduced the firm’s effective tax rates from 2009 to 2010.  
The transaction was captured in the tax reserve liability (unrecognized tax 
benefit).  The transaction’s legitimacy is pending before the IRS, and it is 
uncertain whether the position will be sustained upon IRS audit. 
 The tax planning for both Bradley’s Books and Sight and Sound Superstore is 
relatively straightforward, involving uncomplicated tax positions and strategies. 
 
 Bradley’s Books engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, a Big 4 public accounting firm, 
to provide tax services.  Bradley’s Books engaged Burton & Olde, LLP, also a 
Big 4 public accounting firm, to serve as the external auditor. 
 
 Sight and Sound Superstore engaged Livingston, LLP, a Big 4 public accounting 
firm to provide both tax and audit services.   
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Q1:  Which of the two tax preparers is more competent in your judgment? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are equally 
competent 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q2:  Which of the two preparers is more likely to have additional knowledge of the 
factors involved in general tax preparation? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
have equal 
general tax 
knowledge 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
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Q3:  Which of the two preparers is more likely to have additional knowledge of client-
specific factors involved in tax preparation? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
have equal 
client-
specific tax 
knowledge 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q4:  Which of the two preparers is more likely to have additional client-specific 
resources available for tax preparation? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
have equal 
resources 
available 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
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Q5:  Which of the two preparers is more independent? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are equally 
independent 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q6:  Which of the two preparers is less biased in tax preparation and reporting? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are equally 
biased or 
unbiased 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q7:  Which of the two preparers is less likely to be truthful in their tax planning, 
preparation, and reporting? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are equally 
truthful 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
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Q8:  Which of the two preparers is more credible? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are equally 
credible 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q9:  Which firm is more qualified to serve as the tax preparer for its respective client? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, 
LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are 
equally 
qualified 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
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Q10:  The cost associated with a loss of reputation due to performing the tax planning 
and preparation work poorly is higher for… 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
Neither.  
The cost is 
the same 
for both 
preparers 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q11:  Bradley’s Books’ management is credible. 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Completely 
Disagree 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Completely 
Agree 
 
 
Q12:  Sight and Sound Superstore’s management is credible. 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Completely 
Disagree 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Completely 
Agree 
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Q13: How risky do you believe the tax position taken by Bradley’s Books is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not risky 
at all 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
risky 
 
 
Q14: If you perceive the tax position is risky, to what factor do you attribute the risk? 
 
 
 
Q15: How risky do you believe the tax position taken by Sight and Sound Superstore is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not risky 
at all 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
risky 
 
 
Q16: If you perceive the tax position is risky, to what factor do you attribute the risk? 
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Please answer the following questions according to your general opinion (not 
specifically related to the case provided). 
Q17:  In general, are you relatively more concerned about the independence of the tax 
preparer or the competence of the tax preparer? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Independence 
2 3 4 
Equally 
concerned 
regarding 
both 
5 6 7 
Competence 
 
 
Q18:  When the same accounting firm is providing both audit and tax services, are you 
more concerned about the independence of the tax preparer or the competence of the tax 
preparer? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Independence 
2 3 4 
Equally 
concerned 
regarding 
both 
5 6 7 
Competence 
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Q19: When comparing two firms, one which has engaged a single accounting firm to 
jointly provide both tax and audit services and one which has engaged two separate 
accounting firms to provide tax and audit services, does your relative concern for 
independence or competence change?  In other words, how would you complete the 
following sentences: 
When one firm provides both tax and audit services, I am _____________________ than 
when separate firms provide tax and audit services.   
A. More concerned about independence 
B. Less concerned about independence 
C. No more or less concerned about independence 
 
When one firm provides both tax and audit services, I am _____________________ than 
when separate firms provide tax and audit services. 
A. More concerned about competence 
B. Less concerned about competence 
C. No more or less concerned about competence 
 
Q20:  In general, the cost associated with a loss of reputation due to performing the tax 
planning and preparation work poorly is… 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Higher for 
the auditor 
tax preparer 
2 3 4 
The same for 
both entities 
5 6 7 
Higher for 
the non-
auditor tax 
preparer 
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Q21: To what extent do you believe the joint provision of tax and audit services by an 
auditor impairs auditor independence?  
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Auditor 
independence 
is not 
impaired 
2 3 4 
 Neutral 
5 6 7 
Auditor 
independence 
is severely 
impaired 
 
 
Q22: To what extent do you believe the joint provision of tax and audit services by an 
auditor affects the quality of a firm’s tax services?  
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Tax quality 
is much 
lower 
2 3 4 
No effect 
on tax 
quality 
5 6 7 
Tax quality 
is much 
higher 
 
 
Q23: To what extent do you believe the joint provision of tax and audit services by an 
auditor affects financial reporting quality? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Financial 
reporting 
quality is 
much 
lower 
2 3 4 
No effect 
on 
financial 
reporting 
quality 
5 6 7 
Financial 
reporting 
quality is 
much 
higher 
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Q24: To what extent do you believe the joint provision of tax and audit services by an 
auditor affects audit quality?  
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Audit 
quality is 
much 
lower 
2 3 4 
No effect 
on audit 
quality 
5 6 7 
Audit 
quality is 
much 
higher 
 
 
Q25: How important do you consider tax policy to be when evaluating a potential 
investment in general?  
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not 
important 
at all 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
important 
 
 
Q26: Do you think your thoughts about a firm engaging one accounting firm to provide 
both tax and audit services would be different if you were a current shareholder rather 
than a potential shareholder?  Please explain. 
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Q27: What is your current profession? 
 
 
 
Q28: How many years’ experience do you have in your current position? 
A. Less than 1 year 
B. 1 year to less than 3 years 
C. 3 years to less than 5 years 
D. More than 5 years 
 
Q29: How much experience do you have as a tax professional (answer in years or months 
of tax experience)? 
 
________________ 
 
 
Q30: Do you have personal experience buying or selling an individual company’s 
common stock or debt securities (not through a mutual or pension fund?) 
A. Yes 
 
B. No 
 
 
Q31.  Do you intend to invest in an individual company’s common stock or debt 
securities in the next five years? 
A. Yes 
 
B. No 
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Q32: How familiar are you with FIN 48 and/or Unrecognized Tax Benefits? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Very 
unfamiliar 
2 3 4 
Somewhat 
familiar 
5 6 7 
Very 
familiar 
 
 
Q33: Do you think the reserve for Unrecognized Tax Benefit is a signal of earnings 
management? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Absolutely 
not 
2 3 4 
Unsure 
5 6 7 
Absolutely 
 
Q34: In which graduate program are you currently enrolled? ______________________ 
 
YOU ARE FINISHED. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION. 
PLEASE PLACE THESE COMPLETED MATERIALS IN ENVELOPE #2, AND 
RETURN ALL ENVELOPES TO THE RESEARCHER. 
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LOW AGGRESSIVENESS, HIGH COMPLEXITY CONDITION 
 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
As a potential investor, you have obtained the following background information from 
the 2010 annual reports of Bradley’s Books and Sight and Sound Superstore.  Additional 
information has been provided for your consideration as well.  Please review both sets of 
information before answering the case questions.   
 
 
 
Bradley’s Books 
Business and Products 
Bradley’s Books, a publicly traded, Fortune 500 company (BDB), operates book and 
music superstores.  At December 31, 2010, Bradley’s Books operated 350 superstores in 
the United States.  In addition, Bradley’s Books operates a proprietary e-commerce Web 
site, www.BradleysBooks.com, which was launched in 2007. 
Bradley’s Books’ business strategy is designed to address the most significant 
opportunities and challenges facing the Company. In particular, challenges include 
commoditization in primary product categories, an extremely competitive marketplace 
(including both store-based and online competitors), the seasonal nature of sales as a 
retailer, and product formats that are evolving from physical to digital formats. 
 
Significant Accounting Policies 
In accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), revenue is 
recognized when earned.  In preparing financial statements in conformity with GAAP, 
the Company is required to make estimates and assumptions that affect the reported 
amounts of assets and liabilities and the disclosure of contingent assets and liabilities at 
the date of the financial statements and revenues and expenses during the reporting 
period. Actual results could differ from those estimates. 
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Income Statement (all figures in millions) 
Fiscal Year ending December 31 
 
 AUDITED 
 2009 2010 
Revenue $51.00 $61.00 
Cost of Sales  25.40   30.50 
Gross Profit  25.60   30.50 
Lease Expense    4.90     5.80 
Selling, General & Administrative Expense  12.50   14.80 
Earnings Before Income Taxes   8.20    9.90 
Income Tax Expense   2.20    2.64 
Net Income $6.00   $7.26 
 
 
Balance Sheet (all figures in millions) 
Fiscal Year ending December 31 
 AUDITED 
 2009 2010 
Assets   
Current Assets $17.2 $19.6 
Property, Plant, and Equipment     8.2     8.1 
Intangible Assets     2.4     2.4 
Other Assets     2.1     2.4 
     Total Assets    29.9    32.5 
   
Liabilities   
Current Liabilities $14.8 $15.9 
Long-term Liabilities     5.9     5.9 
     Total Liabilities   20.7   21.8 
   
Stockholders’ Equity     9.2   10.7 
     Total Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity   29.9   32.5 
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Additional information: 
 Bradley’s Books’ effective tax rate for 2010 was 26.7%.  The industry average 
effective tax rate was 26.8%. 
 
 During 2010, Bradley’s Books engaged in an innovative tax transaction that 
reduced the firm’s effective tax rate from 26.8% in 2009 to 26.7% in 2010.  This 
transaction is captured in the tax reserve liability (unrecognized tax benefit).  It is 
highly likely that if Bradley’s Books were to be audited by the IRS, the position 
would be allowed.  The transaction does not increase the risk of audit.     
 
 Some of the tax planning for Bradley’s Books involved complex tax positions and 
strategies, which required careful structuring and an in-depth understanding of 
relevant, interacting factors from the financial statements and tax records.   
 
 Bradley’s Books has engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, as the tax preparer.  Crandall 
Hedge, LLP, will only provide tax services to Bradley’s Books.  Crandall Hedge, 
LLP, is a Big 4 public accounting firm.   
 
 Bradley’s Books has engaged Burton & Olde, LLP, also a Big 4 public 
accounting firm, to serve as the external auditor. 
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Please answer the following questions by marking the circle that corresponds to 
your judgment.  Feel free to refer back to the case materials in order to answer the 
questions. 
Q1: How aggressive do you believe the tax position taken by the company is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Extremely 
unaggressive 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
aggressive 
 
 
 
Q2: How complex do you believe the company’s tax planning is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not 
complex at 
all  
2 3 4 
Somewhat 
complex 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
complex 
 
 
Q3: Which of the following best describes Bradley’s Books? 
A. Bradley’s Books is a small, privately owned company, operating a handful of 
bookstores. 
 
B. Bradley’s Books is a large, publicly traded company, operating many 
bookstores. 
 
C. The information is not provided in the case. 
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Q4:  Which of the following is true regarding the tax preparer engaged by Bradley’s 
Books?  Remember: You may look back over the case materials to determine the correct 
answer. 
A. Bradley’s Books has engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, a Big 4 public accounting 
firm, to provide BOTH tax and audit services.   
B. Bradley’s Books has engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, a Big 4 public accounting 
firm, to provide ONLY tax services and has engaged Burton & Olde, LLP, to 
provide audit services.   
C. Bradley’s Books has engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, which is NOT a Big 4 
public accounting firm, to provide BOTH tax and audit services.   
D. Bradley’s Books has engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, which is NOT a Big 4 
public accounting firm, to provide ONLY tax services and has engaged 
Burton & Olde, LLP, to provide audit services.   
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Sight and Sound Superstore 
Business and Products 
Sight and Sound Superstore, a publicly traded, Fortune 500 company (SSS), operates 
book and music superstores.  At December 31, 2010, Sight and Sound Superstore 
operated 350 superstores in the United States.  In addition, Sight and Sound Superstore 
operates a proprietary e-commerce Web site, www.SandSSuperstore.com, which was 
launched in 2007. 
Sight and Sound Superstore’ business strategy is designed to address the most significant 
opportunities and challenges facing the Company. In particular, challenges include 
commoditization in primary product categories, an extremely competitive marketplace 
(including both store-based and online competitors), the seasonal nature of sales as a 
retailer, and product formats that are evolving from physical to digital formats. 
 
Significant Accounting Policies 
In accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), revenue is 
recognized when earned.  In preparing financial statements in conformity with GAAP, 
the Company is required to make estimates and assumptions that affect the reported 
amounts of assets and liabilities and the disclosure of contingent assets and liabilities at 
the date of the financial statements and revenues and expenses during the reporting 
period. Actual results could differ from those estimates. 
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Income Statement (all figures in millions) 
Fiscal Year ending December 31 
 
 AUDITED 
 2009 2010 
Revenue $71.40 $85.40 
Cost of Sales   35.56   42.70 
Gross Profit   35.84   42.70 
Lease Expense     6.86     8.12 
Selling, General & Administrative Expense   17.50   20.72 
Earnings Before Income Taxes   11.48    13.86 
Income Tax Expense     3.08      3.70 
Net Income   $8.40   $10.16 
 
 
Balance Sheet (all figures in millions) 
Fiscal Year ending December 31 
 AUDITED 
 2009 2010 
Assets   
Current Assets $ 24.08 $27.44 
Property, Plant, and Equipment    11.48    11.34 
Intangible Assets      3.36     3.36 
Other Assets      2.94     3.36 
     Total Assets    41.86    45.50 
   
Liabilities   
Current Liabilities $20.72 $22.26 
Long-term Liabilities     8.26     8.26 
     Total Liabilities   28.98   30.52 
   
Stockholders’ Equity   12.88   14.98 
     Total Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity   41.86   45.50 
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Additional information: 
 Sight and Sound Superstore’s effective tax rate for 2010 was 26.7%.  The industry 
average effective tax rate was 26.8%. 
 
 During 2010, Sight and Sound Superstore engaged in an innovative tax 
transaction that reduced the firm’s effective tax rate from 26.8% in 2009 to 26.7% 
in 2010.  This transaction is captured in the tax reserve liability (unrecognized tax 
benefit).  It is highly likely that if Sight and Sound Superstore were to be audited 
by the IRS, the position would be allowed.  The transaction does not increase the 
risk of audit.   
 
 Some of the tax planning for Sight and Sound Superstore involved complex tax 
positions and strategies, which required careful structuring and an in-depth 
understanding of relevant, interacting factors from the financial statements and 
tax records. 
 
 Sight and Sound Superstore has engaged Livingston, LLP, as the tax preparer.  
Livingston, LLP, is a Big 4 public accounting firm.  Sight and Sound Superstore 
has engaged Livingston, LLP, to also serve as the external auditor. 
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Q5: How aggressive do you believe the tax position taken by the company is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Extremely 
unaggressive 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
aggressive 
 
 
Q6: How complex do you believe the company’s tax planning is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not 
complex at 
all  
2 3 4 
Somewhat 
complex 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
complex 
 
 
Q7: Which of the following best describes Sight and Sound Superstore? 
A. Sight and Sound Superstore is a small, privately owned company, operating a 
handful of bookstores. 
 
B. Sight and Sound Superstore is a large, publicly traded company, operating 
many bookstores. 
 
C. The information is not provided in the case. 
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Q8:  Which of the following is true regarding the tax preparer engaged by Sight and 
Sound Superstore?  Remember: You may look back over the case materials to determine 
the correct answer. 
A. Sight and Sound Superstore has engaged Livingston, LLP, a Big 4 public 
accounting firm, to provide BOTH tax and audit services.   
B. Sight and Sound Superstore has engaged Livingston, LLP, a Big 4 public 
accounting firm, to provide ONLY tax services and has engaged SAIB, LLP, 
to provide audit services.   
C. Sight and Sound Superstore has engaged Livingston, LLP, which is NOT a 
Big 4 public accounting firm, to provide BOTH tax and audit services.   
D. Sight and Sound Superstore has engaged Livingston, LLP, which is NOT a 
Big 4 public accounting firm, to provide ONLY tax services and has engaged 
SAIB, LLP, to provide audit services.   
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INSTRUCTIONS 
 After reviewing the background information provided above for Bradley’s Books 
and Sight and Sound Superstore, please answer the following questions by 
providing an answer that best indicates your judgment.  You may refer back to the 
case materials in answering the questions. 
 
 After you have answered a question, please do not go back and change your 
response. 
 
 
Q9:  Please allocate a $10,000 investment between Bradley’s Books and Sight and 
Sound Superstore in the space provided.  Please confirm that your total equals 
$10,000. 
Amount allocated to Bradley’s Books: _____________________________ 
 
Amount allocated to Sight and Sound Superstore: ______________________ 
 
 
Q10: What is the single most important factor you considered in support of your 
investment allocation? 
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Q11: If the tax preparer had an effect on your investment decision, please rank the 
following factors by the importance each played in your decision for which company you 
prefer. 
A. Client-specific competence 
B. General competence 
C. Independence 
D. Other factors __________________ 
 
1.  
2. 
3. 
4. 
 
 
If you would like to provide a justification for your decisions, please feel free to do 
so in the space provided below. 
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Q12: Please indicate on the scale below how attractive you believe Bradley’s Books is as 
a potential investment. 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not at all 
attractive 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Very 
Attractive 
 
 
Q13: Please indicate on the scale below how attractive you believe Sight and Sound 
Superstore is as a potential investment. 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not at all 
attractive 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Very 
Attractive 
 
 
 
When done, please return the completed materials to Envelope #1, and open 
Envelope #2. 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
 Please answer the following questions by circling the letter or checking the circle 
that corresponds to your personal judgment. 
 
 Please answer the questions in the order presented, and please do not read ahead. 
 
 After you have answered a question, please do not go back and change your 
response. 
 
 
As a reminder: 
 Both Bradley’s Books’ and Sight and Sound Superstore had an effective tax rate 
of 26.7% for 2010.  The industry average effective tax rate was 26.8%. 
 Both Bradley’s Books and Sight and Sound Superstore engaged in an innovative 
tax transaction which reduced the firm’s effective tax rates from 2009 to 2010.  
The transaction was captured in the tax reserve liability (unrecognized tax 
benefit).  It is highly likely that if Bradley’s Books or Sight and Sound Superstore 
were to be audited by the IRS, the position would be allowed.  The transaction 
does not increase the risk of audit. 
 Some of the tax planning for Bradley’s Books and Sight and Sound Superstore 
involved complex tax positions and strategies, which required careful structuring 
and an in-depth understanding of relevant, interacting factors from the financial 
statements and tax records. 
 
 Bradley’s Books engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, a Big 4 public accounting firm, 
to provide tax services.  Bradley’s Books engaged Burton & Olde, LLP, also a 
Big 4 public accounting firm, to serve as the external auditor. 
 
 Sight and Sound Superstore engaged Livingston, LLP, a Big 4 public accounting 
firm to provide both tax and audit services.   
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Q1:  Which of the two tax preparers is more competent in your judgment? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are equally 
competent 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q2:  Which of the two preparers is more likely to have additional knowledge of the 
factors involved in general tax preparation? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
have equal 
general tax 
knowledge 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
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Q3:  Which of the two preparers is more likely to have additional knowledge of client-
specific factors involved in tax preparation? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
have equal 
client-
specific tax 
knowledge 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q4:  Which of the two preparers is more likely to have additional client-specific 
resources available for tax preparation? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
have equal 
resources 
available 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
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Q5:  Which of the two preparers is more independent? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are equally 
independent 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q6:  Which of the two preparers is less biased in tax preparation and reporting? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are equally 
biased or 
unbiased 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q7:  Which of the two preparers is less likely to be truthful in their tax planning, 
preparation, and reporting? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are equally 
truthful 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
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Q8:  Which of the two preparers is more credible? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are equally 
credible 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q9:  Which firm is more qualified to serve as the tax preparer for its respective client? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, 
LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are 
equally 
qualified 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
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Q10:  The cost associated with a loss of reputation due to performing the tax planning 
and preparation work poorly is higher for… 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
Neither.  
The cost is 
the same 
for both 
preparers 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q11:  Bradley’s Books’ management is credible. 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Completely 
Disagree 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Completely 
Agree 
 
 
Q12:  Sight and Sound Superstore’s management is credible. 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Completely 
Disagree 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Completely 
Agree 
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Q13: How risky do you believe the tax position taken by Bradley’s Books is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not risky 
at all 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
risky 
 
 
Q14: If you perceive the tax position is risky, to what factor do you attribute the risk? 
 
 
 
Q15: How risky do you believe the tax position taken by Sight and Sound Superstore is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not risky 
at all 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
risky 
 
 
Q16: If you perceive the tax position is risky, to what factor do you attribute the risk? 
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Please answer the following questions according to your general opinion (not 
specifically related to the case provided). 
Q17:  In general, are you relatively more concerned about the independence of the tax 
preparer or the competence of the tax preparer? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Independence 
2 3 4 
Equally 
concerned 
regarding 
both 
5 6 7 
Competence 
 
 
Q18:  When the same accounting firm is providing both audit and tax services, are you 
more concerned about the independence of the tax preparer or the competence of the tax 
preparer? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Independence 
2 3 4 
Equally 
concerned 
regarding 
both 
5 6 7 
Competence 
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Q19: When comparing two firms, one which has engaged a single accounting firm to 
jointly provide both tax and audit services and one which has engaged two separate 
accounting firms to provide tax and audit services, does your relative concern for 
independence or competence change?  In other words, how would you complete the 
following sentences: 
When one firm provides both tax and audit services, I am _____________________ than 
when separate firms provide tax and audit services.   
A. More concerned about independence 
B. Less concerned about independence 
C. No more or less concerned about independence 
 
When one firm provides both tax and audit services, I am _____________________ than 
when separate firms provide tax and audit services. 
A. More concerned about competence 
B. Less concerned about competence 
C. No more or less concerned about competence 
 
Q20:  In general, the cost associated with a loss of reputation due to performing the tax 
planning and preparation work poorly is… 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Higher for 
the auditor 
tax preparer 
2 3 4 
The same for 
both entities 
5 6 7 
Higher for 
the non-
auditor tax 
preparer 
 
 
  
126 
 
Q21: To what extent do you believe the joint provision of tax and audit services by an 
auditor impairs auditor independence?  
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Auditor 
independence 
is not 
impaired 
2 3 4 
 Neutral 
5 6 7 
Auditor 
independence 
is severely 
impaired 
 
 
Q22: To what extent do you believe the joint provision of tax and audit services by an 
auditor affects the quality of a firm’s tax services?  
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Tax quality 
is much 
lower 
2 3 4 
No effect 
on tax 
quality 
5 6 7 
Tax quality 
is much 
higher 
 
 
Q23: To what extent do you believe the joint provision of tax and audit services by an 
auditor affects financial reporting quality? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Financial 
reporting 
quality is 
much 
lower 
2 3 4 
No effect 
on 
financial 
reporting 
quality 
5 6 7 
Financial 
reporting 
quality is 
much 
higher 
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Q24: To what extent do you believe the joint provision of tax and audit services by an 
auditor affects audit quality?  
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Audit 
quality is 
much 
lower 
2 3 4 
No effect 
on audit 
quality 
5 6 7 
Audit 
quality is 
much 
higher 
 
 
Q25: How important do you consider tax policy to be when evaluating a potential 
investment in general?  
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not 
important 
at all 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
important 
 
 
Q26: Do you think your thoughts about a firm engaging one accounting firm to provide 
both tax and audit services would be different if you were a current shareholder rather 
than a potential shareholder?  Please explain. 
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Q27: What is your current profession? 
 
 
 
Q28: How many years’ experience do you have in your current position? 
A. Less than 1 year 
B. 1 year to less than 3 years 
C. 3 years to less than 5 years 
D. More than 5 years 
 
Q29: How much experience do you have as a tax professional (answer in years or months 
of tax experience)? 
 
________________ 
 
 
Q30: Do you have personal experience buying or selling an individual company’s 
common stock or debt securities (not through a mutual or pension fund?) 
A. Yes 
 
B. No 
 
 
Q31.  Do you intend to invest in an individual company’s common stock or debt 
securities in the next five years? 
A. Yes 
 
B. No 
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Q32: How familiar are you with FIN 48 and/or Unrecognized Tax Benefits? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Very 
unfamiliar 
2 3 4 
Somewhat 
familiar 
5 6 7 
Very 
familiar 
 
 
Q33: Do you think the reserve for Unrecognized Tax Benefit is a signal of earnings 
management? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Absolutely 
not 
2 3 4 
Unsure 
5 6 7 
Absolutely 
 
Q34: In which graduate program are you currently enrolled? ______________________ 
 
YOU ARE FINISHED. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION. 
PLEASE PLACE THESE COMPLETED MATERIALS IN ENVELOPE #2, AND 
RETURN ALL ENVELOPES TO THE RESEARCHER. 
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LOW AGGRESSIVENESS, LOW COMPLEXITY CONDITION 
 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
As a potential investor, you have obtained the following background information from 
the 2010 annual reports of Bradley’s Books and Sight and Sound Superstore.  Additional 
information has been provided for your consideration as well.  Please review both sets of 
information before answering the case questions.   
 
 
 
Bradley’s Books 
Business and Products 
Bradley’s Books, a publicly traded, Fortune 500 company (BDB), operates book and 
music superstores.  At December 31, 2010, Bradley’s Books operated 350 superstores in 
the United States.  In addition, Bradley’s Books operates a proprietary e-commerce Web 
site, www.BradleysBooks.com, which was launched in 2007. 
Bradley’s Books’ business strategy is designed to address the most significant 
opportunities and challenges facing the Company. In particular, challenges include 
commoditization in primary product categories, an extremely competitive marketplace 
(including both store-based and online competitors), the seasonal nature of sales as a 
retailer, and product formats that are evolving from physical to digital formats. 
 
Significant Accounting Policies 
In accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), revenue is 
recognized when earned.  In preparing financial statements in conformity with GAAP, 
the Company is required to make estimates and assumptions that affect the reported 
amounts of assets and liabilities and the disclosure of contingent assets and liabilities at 
the date of the financial statements and revenues and expenses during the reporting 
period. Actual results could differ from those estimates. 
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Income Statement (all figures in millions) 
Fiscal Year ending December 31 
 
 AUDITED 
 2009 2010 
Revenue $51.00 $61.00 
Cost of Sales  25.40   30.50 
Gross Profit  25.60   30.50 
Lease Expense    4.90     5.80 
Selling, General & Administrative Expense  12.50   14.80 
Earnings Before Income Taxes   8.20    9.90 
Income Tax Expense   2.20    2.64 
Net Income $6.00   $7.26 
 
 
Balance Sheet (all figures in millions) 
Fiscal Year ending December 31 
 AUDITED 
 2009 2010 
Assets   
Current Assets $17.2 $19.6 
Property, Plant, and Equipment     8.2     8.1 
Intangible Assets     2.4     2.4 
Other Assets     2.1     2.4 
     Total Assets    29.9    32.5 
   
Liabilities   
Current Liabilities $14.8 $15.9 
Long-term Liabilities     5.9     5.9 
     Total Liabilities   20.7   21.8 
   
Stockholders’ Equity     9.2   10.7 
     Total Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity   29.9   32.5 
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Additional information: 
 Bradley’s Books’ effective tax rate for 2010 was 26.7%.  The industry average 
effective tax rate was 26.8%. 
 
 During 2010, Bradley’s Books engaged in an innovative tax transaction that 
reduced the firm’s effective tax rate from 26.8% in 2009 to 26.7% in 2010.  This 
transaction is captured in the tax reserve liability (unrecognized tax benefit).  It is 
highly likely that if Bradley’s Books were to be audited by the IRS, the position 
would be allowed.  The transaction does not increase the risk of audit.     
 
 The tax planning for Bradley’s Books is relatively straightforward, involving 
uncomplicated tax positions and strategies. 
 
 Bradley’s Books has engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, as the tax preparer.  Crandall 
Hedge, LLP, will only provide tax services to Bradley’s Books.  Crandall Hedge, 
LLP, is a Big 4 public accounting firm.   
 
 Bradley’s Books has engaged Burton & Olde, LLP, also a Big 4 public 
accounting firm, to serve as the external auditor. 
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Please answer the following questions by marking the circle that corresponds to 
your judgment.  Feel free to refer back to the case materials in order to answer the 
questions. 
Q1: How aggressive do you believe the tax position taken by the company is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Extremely 
unaggressive 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
aggressive 
 
 
 
Q2: How complex do you believe the company’s tax planning is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not 
complex at 
all  
2 3 4 
Somewhat 
complex 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
complex 
 
 
Q3: Which of the following best describes Bradley’s Books? 
A. Bradley’s Books is a small, privately owned company, operating a handful of 
bookstores. 
 
B. Bradley’s Books is a large, publicly traded company, operating many 
bookstores. 
 
C. The information is not provided in the case. 
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Q4:  Which of the following is true regarding the tax preparer engaged by Bradley’s 
Books?  Remember: You may look back over the case materials to determine the correct 
answer. 
A. Bradley’s Books has engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, a Big 4 public accounting 
firm, to provide BOTH tax and audit services.   
B. Bradley’s Books has engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, a Big 4 public accounting 
firm, to provide ONLY tax services and has engaged Burton & Olde, LLP, to 
provide audit services.   
C. Bradley’s Books has engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, which is NOT a Big 4 
public accounting firm, to provide BOTH tax and audit services.   
D. Bradley’s Books has engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, which is NOT a Big 4 
public accounting firm, to provide ONLY tax services and has engaged 
Burton & Olde, LLP, to provide audit services.   
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Sight and Sound Superstore 
Business and Products 
Sight and Sound Superstore, a publicly traded, Fortune 500 company (SSS), operates 
book and music superstores.  At December 31, 2010, Sight and Sound Superstore 
operated 350 superstores in the United States.  In addition, Sight and Sound Superstore 
operates a proprietary e-commerce Web site, www.SandSSuperstore.com, which was 
launched in 2007. 
Sight and Sound Superstore’ business strategy is designed to address the most significant 
opportunities and challenges facing the Company. In particular, challenges include 
commoditization in primary product categories, an extremely competitive marketplace 
(including both store-based and online competitors), the seasonal nature of sales as a 
retailer, and product formats that are evolving from physical to digital formats. 
 
Significant Accounting Policies 
In accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), revenue is 
recognized when earned.  In preparing financial statements in conformity with GAAP, 
the Company is required to make estimates and assumptions that affect the reported 
amounts of assets and liabilities and the disclosure of contingent assets and liabilities at 
the date of the financial statements and revenues and expenses during the reporting 
period. Actual results could differ from those estimates. 
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Income Statement (all figures in millions) 
Fiscal Year ending December 31 
 
 AUDITED 
 2009 2010 
Revenue $71.40 $85.40 
Cost of Sales   35.56   42.70 
Gross Profit   35.84   42.70 
Lease Expense     6.86     8.12 
Selling, General & Administrative Expense   17.50   20.72 
Earnings Before Income Taxes   11.48    13.86 
Income Tax Expense     3.08      3.70 
Net Income   $8.40   $10.16 
 
 
Balance Sheet (all figures in millions) 
Fiscal Year ending December 31 
 AUDITED 
 2009 2010 
Assets   
Current Assets $ 24.08 $27.44 
Property, Plant, and Equipment    11.48    11.34 
Intangible Assets      3.36     3.36 
Other Assets      2.94     3.36 
     Total Assets    41.86    45.50 
   
Liabilities   
Current Liabilities $20.72 $22.26 
Long-term Liabilities     8.26     8.26 
     Total Liabilities   28.98   30.52 
   
Stockholders’ Equity   12.88   14.98 
     Total Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity   41.86   45.50 
   
  
137 
 
 
 
Additional information: 
 Sight and Sound Superstore’s effective tax rate for 2010 was 26.7%.  The industry 
average effective tax rate was 26.8%. 
 
 During 2010, Sight and Sound Superstore engaged in an innovative tax 
transaction that reduced the firm’s effective tax rate from 26.8% in 2009 to 26.7% 
in 2010.  This transaction is captured in the tax reserve liability (unrecognized tax 
benefit).  It is highly likely that if Sight and Sound Superstore were to be audited 
by the IRS, the position would be allowed.  The transaction does not increase the 
risk of audit.   
 
 The tax planning for Sight and Sound Superstore is relatively straightforward, 
involving uncomplicated tax positions and strategies. 
 
 Sight and Sound Superstore has engaged Livingston, LLP, as the tax preparer.  
Livingston, LLP, is a Big 4 public accounting firm.  Sight and Sound Superstore 
has engaged Livingston, LLP, to also serve as the external auditor. 
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Q5: How aggressive do you believe the tax position taken by the company is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Extremely 
unaggressive 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
aggressive 
 
 
Q6: How complex do you believe the company’s tax planning is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not 
complex at 
all  
2 3 4 
Somewhat 
complex 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
complex 
 
 
Q7: Which of the following best describes Sight and Sound Superstore? 
A. Sight and Sound Superstore is a small, privately owned company, operating a 
handful of bookstores. 
 
B. Sight and Sound Superstore is a large, publicly traded company, operating 
many bookstores. 
 
C. The information is not provided in the case. 
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Q8:  Which of the following is true regarding the tax preparer engaged by Sight and 
Sound Superstore?  Remember: You may look back over the case materials to determine 
the correct answer. 
A. Sight and Sound Superstore has engaged Livingston, LLP, a Big 4 public 
accounting firm, to provide BOTH tax and audit services.   
B. Sight and Sound Superstore has engaged Livingston, LLP, a Big 4 public 
accounting firm, to provide ONLY tax services and has engaged SAIB, LLP, 
to provide audit services.   
C. Sight and Sound Superstore has engaged Livingston, LLP, which is NOT a 
Big 4 public accounting firm, to provide BOTH tax and audit services.   
D. Sight and Sound Superstore has engaged Livingston, LLP, which is NOT a 
Big 4 public accounting firm, to provide ONLY tax services and has engaged 
SAIB, LLP, to provide audit services.   
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INSTRUCTIONS 
 After reviewing the background information provided above for Bradley’s Books 
and Sight and Sound Superstore, please answer the following questions by 
providing an answer that best indicates your judgment.  You may refer back to the 
case materials in answering the questions. 
 
 After you have answered a question, please do not go back and change your 
response. 
 
 
Q9:  Please allocate a $10,000 investment between Bradley’s Books and Sight and 
Sound Superstore in the space provided.  Please confirm that your total equals 
$10,000. 
Amount allocated to Bradley’s Books: _____________________________ 
 
Amount allocated to Sight and Sound Superstore: ______________________ 
 
 
Q10: What is the single most important factor you considered in support of your 
investment allocation? 
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Q11: If the tax preparer had an effect on your investment decision, please rank the 
following factors by the importance each played in your decision for which company you 
prefer. 
A. Client-specific competence 
B. General competence 
C. Independence 
D. Other factors __________________ 
 
1.  
2. 
3. 
4. 
 
 
If you would like to provide a justification for your decisions, please feel free to do 
so in the space provided below. 
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Q12: Please indicate on the scale below how attractive you believe Bradley’s Books is as 
a potential investment. 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not at all 
attractive 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Very 
Attractive 
 
 
Q13: Please indicate on the scale below how attractive you believe Sight and Sound 
Superstore is as a potential investment. 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not at all 
attractive 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Very 
Attractive 
 
 
 
When done, please return the completed materials to Envelope #1, and open 
Envelope #2. 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
 Please answer the following questions by circling the letter or checking the circle 
that corresponds to your personal judgment. 
 
 Please answer the questions in the order presented, and please do not read ahead. 
 
 After you have answered a question, please do not go back and change your 
response. 
 
 
As a reminder: 
 Both Bradley’s Books’ and Sight and Sound Superstore had an effective tax rate 
of 26.7% for 2010.  The industry average effective tax rate was 26.8%. 
 Both Bradley’s Books and Sight and Sound Superstore engaged in an innovative 
tax transaction which reduced the firm’s effective tax rates from 2009 to 2010.  
The transaction was captured in the tax reserve liability (unrecognized tax 
benefit).  It is highly likely that if Bradley’s Books or Sight and Sound Superstore 
were to be audited by the IRS, the position would be allowed.  The transaction 
does not increase the risk of audit. 
 The tax planning for both Bradley’s Books and Sight and Sound Superstore is 
relatively straightforward, involving uncomplicated tax positions and strategies. 
 
 Bradley’s Books engaged Crandall Hedge, LLP, a Big 4 public accounting firm, 
to provide tax services.  Bradley’s Books engaged Burton & Olde, LLP, also a 
Big 4 public accounting firm, to serve as the external auditor. 
 
 Sight and Sound Superstore engaged Livingston, LLP, a Big 4 public accounting 
firm to provide both tax and audit services.   
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Q1:  Which of the two tax preparers is more competent in your judgment? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are equally 
competent 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q2:  Which of the two preparers is more likely to have additional knowledge of the 
factors involved in general tax preparation? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
have equal 
general tax 
knowledge 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
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Q3:  Which of the two preparers is more likely to have additional knowledge of client-
specific factors involved in tax preparation? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
have equal 
client-
specific tax 
knowledge 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q4:  Which of the two preparers is more likely to have additional client-specific 
resources available for tax preparation? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
have equal 
resources 
available 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
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Q5:  Which of the two preparers is more independent? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are equally 
independent 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q6:  Which of the two preparers is less biased in tax preparation and reporting? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are equally 
biased or 
unbiased 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q7:  Which of the two preparers is less likely to be truthful in their tax planning, 
preparation, and reporting? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are equally 
truthful 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
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Q8:  Which of the two preparers is more credible? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are equally 
credible 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q9:  Which firm is more qualified to serve as the tax preparer for its respective client? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, 
LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
The two 
preparers 
are 
equally 
qualified 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
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Q10:  The cost associated with a loss of reputation due to performing the tax planning 
and preparation work poorly is higher for… 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Crandall 
Hedge, LLP 
(Bradley’s 
Books’ 
preparer) 
2 3 4 
Neither.  
The cost is 
the same 
for both 
preparers 
5 6 7 
Livingston, 
LLP 
(Sight & 
Sound’s 
preparer) 
 
 
Q11:  Bradley’s Books’ management is credible. 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Completely 
Disagree 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Completely 
Agree 
 
 
Q12:  Sight and Sound Superstore’s management is credible. 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Completely 
Disagree 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Completely 
Agree 
 
 
149 
 
Q13: How risky do you believe the tax position taken by Bradley’s Books is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not risky 
at all 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
risky 
 
 
Q14: If you perceive the tax position is risky, to what factor do you attribute the risk? 
 
 
 
Q15: How risky do you believe the tax position taken by Sight and Sound Superstore is? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not risky 
at all 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
risky 
 
 
Q16: If you perceive the tax position is risky, to what factor do you attribute the risk? 
 
 
 
  
150 
 
Please answer the following questions according to your general opinion (not 
specifically related to the case provided). 
Q17:  In general, are you relatively more concerned about the independence of the tax 
preparer or the competence of the tax preparer? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Independence 
2 3 4 
Equally 
concerned 
regarding 
both 
5 6 7 
Competence 
 
 
Q18:  When the same accounting firm is providing both audit and tax services, are you 
more concerned about the independence of the tax preparer or the competence of the tax 
preparer? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Independence 
2 3 4 
Equally 
concerned 
regarding 
both 
5 6 7 
Competence 
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Q19: When comparing two firms, one which has engaged a single accounting firm to 
jointly provide both tax and audit services and one which has engaged two separate 
accounting firms to provide tax and audit services, does your relative concern for 
independence or competence change?  In other words, how would you complete the 
following sentences: 
When one firm provides both tax and audit services, I am _____________________ than 
when separate firms provide tax and audit services.   
A. More concerned about independence 
B. Less concerned about independence 
C. No more or less concerned about independence 
 
When one firm provides both tax and audit services, I am _____________________ than 
when separate firms provide tax and audit services. 
A. More concerned about competence 
B. Less concerned about competence 
C. No more or less concerned about competence 
 
Q20:  In general, the cost associated with a loss of reputation due to performing the tax 
planning and preparation work poorly is… 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Higher for 
the auditor 
tax preparer 
2 3 4 
The same for 
both entities 
5 6 7 
Higher for 
the non-
auditor tax 
preparer 
 
 
  
152 
 
Q21: To what extent do you believe the joint provision of tax and audit services by an 
auditor impairs auditor independence?  
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Auditor 
independence 
is not 
impaired 
2 3 4 
 Neutral 
5 6 7 
Auditor 
independence 
is severely 
impaired 
 
 
Q22: To what extent do you believe the joint provision of tax and audit services by an 
auditor affects the quality of a firm’s tax services?  
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Tax quality 
is much 
lower 
2 3 4 
No effect 
on tax 
quality 
5 6 7 
Tax quality 
is much 
higher 
 
 
Q23: To what extent do you believe the joint provision of tax and audit services by an 
auditor affects financial reporting quality? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Financial 
reporting 
quality is 
much 
lower 
2 3 4 
No effect 
on 
financial 
reporting 
quality 
5 6 7 
Financial 
reporting 
quality is 
much 
higher 
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Q24: To what extent do you believe the joint provision of tax and audit services by an 
auditor affects audit quality?  
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Audit 
quality is 
much 
lower 
2 3 4 
No effect 
on audit 
quality 
5 6 7 
Audit 
quality is 
much 
higher 
 
 
Q25: How important do you consider tax policy to be when evaluating a potential 
investment in general?  
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Not 
important 
at all 
2 3 4 
Neutral 
5 6 7 
Extremely 
important 
 
 
Q26: Do you think your thoughts about a firm engaging one accounting firm to provide 
both tax and audit services would be different if you were a current shareholder rather 
than a potential shareholder?  Please explain. 
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Q27: What is your current profession? 
 
 
 
Q28: How many years’ experience do you have in your current position? 
A. Less than 1 year 
B. 1 year to less than 3 years 
C. 3 years to less than 5 years 
D. More than 5 years 
 
Q29: How much experience do you have as a tax professional (answer in years or months 
of tax experience)? 
 
________________ 
 
 
Q30: Do you have personal experience buying or selling an individual company’s 
common stock or debt securities (not through a mutual or pension fund?) 
A. Yes 
 
B. No 
 
 
Q31.  Do you intend to invest in an individual company’s common stock or debt 
securities in the next five years? 
A. Yes 
 
B. No 
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Q32: How familiar are you with FIN 48 and/or Unrecognized Tax Benefits? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Very 
unfamiliar 
2 3 4 
Somewhat 
familiar 
5 6 7 
Very 
familiar 
 
 
Q33: Do you think the reserve for Unrecognized Tax Benefit is a signal of earnings 
management? 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
1 
Absolutely 
not 
2 3 4 
Unsure 
5 6 7 
Absolutely 
 
Q34: In which graduate program are you currently enrolled? ______________________ 
 
YOU ARE FINISHED. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION. 
PLEASE PLACE THESE COMPLETED MATERIALS IN ENVELOPE #2, AND 
RETURN ALL ENVELOPES TO THE RESEARCHER. 
 
 
